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They looked only after their own local or regional interests, 
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precise party lines, doing exactly what the party leaders 
apparently wanted. When it came to the statehood issue, two 
poles resulted. Democrats formed a united front against the 
possibility of new states, while Republicans fully supported 
the admittance of new territories into the Union.
In conclusion, research indicates that Dakotans were 
responsible to some degree for the long statehood delay 
because of their disorganized program and suspicious attitude 
toward other parts of the territory. A second conclusion, 
supported precisely by conventional and quantitative analysis, 
shows that Republicans were promoters of statehood for the 
territories and that Democrats were opposed.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the statehood history of the 
present-day states of North and South Dakota. They were 
part of the Territory of Dakota during the years 1861- 
1889, their ultimate division occurring only after a long 
and bitter eighteen-year struggle.
The prime objective of this thesis is to pinpoint 
precisely the reasons why statehood for the Dakotas took 
so many years. It seeks to determine who supported and 
who opposed admission, both in Dakota Territory and in 
the United States Congress, and investigates the reasons 
admission was so long delayed. Specific investigation of 
the Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889, is necessary because it 
was this Congress that ultimately allowed Dakota 
Territory to organize into two states, set forth in the 
Omnibus Bill.
Conventional methods were used to examine 
contemporary and modern histories, pertinent documentary 
collections, congressional records, and territorial
v i i
papers. Quantitative analysis, involving a study of roll- 
call materials was also used.
Results proved that the Dakotans themselves 
contributed to their statehood delays by fragmenting 
into segregated groups lacking direction rather than 
uniting behind a common goal. They looked only after 
their own local or regional interests, instead of those 
of the entire territory. Secondly, partisanship was 
extremely strong in the Fiftieth Congress in Washington. 
Democrats and Republicans consistently voted along 
precise party lines, doing exactly what the party leaders 
apparently wanted. When it came to the statehood issue, 
two poles resulted. Democrats formed a united front 
against the possibility of new states, while Republicans 
fully supported the admittance of new territories into 
the Union.
In conclusion, research indicates that Dakotans were 
responsible to some degree for the long statehood delay 
because of their disorganized program and suspicious 
attitude toward other parts of the territory. A second 
conclusion, supported precisely by conventional and 
quantitative analysis, show that Republicans were 
promoters of statehood for the territories and that 
Democrats were opposed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The present-day states of North and South Dakota 
were part of the Territory of Dakota during the years 
1861-1889, their ultimate division occurring only after a 
long and bitter eighteen-year struggle. It was a time of 
frustration, as Congress either ignored or belittled 
numerous petitions, resolutions, and memorials supporting 
statehood for Dakota Territory. The early years, from 
1861 to 1871, were relatively calm, with a concentrated 
effort to settle and develop the area. But thereafter, 
the territorial inhabitants engaged in a constant 
struggle to prove to Congress that they were able to take 
control of their government and deserved statehood.
This paper traces the history of the statehood 
movement. It seeks to determine who supported and who 
opposed admission, both in the Dakota Territory and in 
the United States Congress, and investigates the reasons 
admission was so long delayed. Because of their initial 
union, North and South Dakota cannot be discussed 
separately; their beginnings are interwoven, with the 
history of each state affecting the other.
1
2The prime objective of this thesis is to pinpoint 
precisely the reasons why statehood for the Dakotas took 
so many years. There seems to be a considerable amount 
of time between the initial memorials sent to the United 
States Congress in 1871 and the final passage of the 
Omnibus (statehood) Bill in 1889. I intend to investi­
gate the issues and events occurring in the territory 
that seem to have delayed political action. I will also 
examine the United States House and Senate. The legisla­
tive action of Congress ultimately granted statehood, but 
eighteen years' delay implies indifference.1 The long 
period of territorial tutelage, from 1861 to 1889, 
occurred when Gilded Age political partisanship was 
intense. Party loyalty caused some sympathic individ­
uals, who favored statehood for the territories, to 
forego their consciences and vote as the party dictated. 
It is my contention that the main culprits in this 
unfortunate situation appear to be Democrats. Historio­
graphy indicates that members of this party overlooked 
glowing, favorable reports that arrived frequently from 
the territory, disregarded continual memorials and 
petitions, and chose to ignore individuals who came out 
from Dakota to plead their cause.
The interpretation is basically correct in 
attributing to the Democratic Party the long delay in 
statehood for the Dakotas. Even so, historians have
3underestimated the strength of these party views at the 
point of actual passage, in the last session of the 
Fiftieth Congress. The positive role of the Democrats in 
promoting statehood has also been slighted, perhaps 
because roll-call voting behavior of Democratic congress­
men indicates they were almost universally suspicious of 
the notion that the two states should enter, while 
Republicans were even more unanimous in favor of dual 
statehood. Furthermore, sectionalism (North versus South 
or East versus West) played very little role in influ­
encing attitudes, despite the fact that, on the surface 
at least, statehood would always seem to raise a question 
of eastern versus western influence and would always have 
the effect of diluting eastern political power. Section 
was only important to the extent that the solid 
Democratic South influenced the issue because of its 
partisan, not sectional, point of view. It will become 
clear that Democrats were quite insensitive to the 
statehood question and that Republicans, on the other 
hand, staunchly supported it. The conclusion seems 
inescapable that Democrats were unfair to Dakota's 
citizens in withholding deserved statehood.
The purpose of this paper is to define precisely the 
role of the Democratic and Republican Parties in either 
delaying or supporting statehood for the Territory of 
Dakota. Up to this point, common historical
interpretations of events during the territorial period 
merely suggest that Republicans assisted the statehood 
cause while Democrats blocked the addition of new 
states. The latter seriously believed that their 
political power would be jeopardized by the addition of 
new territories, especially those with strong Republican 
ties as was the case with Dakota. Therefore, they were 
not going to nor did they assist any territorial entrance 
into the Union which would alter party strength. The 
Republicans, on the opposite side, were naturally 
supportive of the statehood issue given the political 
complexion of the territory. My hypothesis, therefore, 
is that Democrats led Dakotans down a path lined with 
false and unfilled promises and that Republicans 
supported territorial ambitions— and yet, Democrats, some 
of them at least, were ultimately responsible for the 
passage of the statehood measure.
I intend to show that there were definite party 
views in the Fiftieth Congress. Democrats and 
Republicans consistently voted along precise party lines, 
doing exactly what the party leaders apparently wanted. 
When it came to the statehood issue, two poles resulted. 
Democrats formed a united front against the possibilty of 
new states while Republicans fully supported the
admittance of new territories into the Union.
5However, even though my hypothesis defines the Democratic 
and Republican roles in the statehood issue, it is 
nevertheless important to point out that Dakota entered 
the Union during Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889, which had 
a Democratic majority in the house. The Democrats, 
however consistently against statehood for the 
territories, actually brought in the new states. This 
was done only under extreme circumstances in the last few 
months before the statehood bill passed. It was only 
after all avenues were closed and it became important to 
"save face," that some Democrats came full circle and 
suddenly supported statehood for the territories. It is 
ironic, as it turns out, that my hypothesis defining the 
Democrats as non-supporters for statehood, actually seems 
disproved on the surface by the passage of the Omnibus 
(statehood) Bill by the Democratic House. However, my 
original hypothesis is nevertheless supported by both the 
historiography of the period and by quantitative 
research. It will be clear that the Democratic Party 
acted irresponsibly by not protecting the interests of 
the unenfranchised citizens for many years, and that they 
clearly prevented Dakota from entering the Union until 
they were forced to change their program.
Another theme that recurs throughout this study is 
the delay that seemed to plague the Territory of Dakota 
throughout the period. Much delay was caused by
6
Democratic congressmen who refused to support statehood 
even though all requirements were fulfilled; but Dakotans 
themselves contributed to their problems by fragmenting 
into segregated groups lacking direction rather than 
uniting behind a common goal. I also found Dakotans 
looked only after their own local or regional interests, 
instead of those of the entire territory, and that 
further delay was caused by a total lack of 
organization. Each of these problems was apparent 
throughout the entire territorial period. Delay was 
certainly a major problem in Dakota, and this point will 
be emphasized in subsequent chapters.
Research will follow two directions. Conventional 
methods will be used to examine contemporary and modern 
histories, pertinent documentary collections, congres­
sional records, and territorial papers. Quantitative 
analysis, involving a study of roll-call materials, 
presents the other technique. I have chosen to broaden 
my research to include the use of the computer, a 
reliable computer program, and the investigative theory 
made feasible by quantitative methodology.
Quantitative history goes beyond the traditional 
monograph or committee report. It also supplements the 
boxes of letters, personal papers, and written speeches 
left to us by our forefathers. These common research 
tools are often adequate when studying prominent,
7outspoken individuals who possessed a desire to record 
their every thought, word, or deed. However, there were 
many minor politicians, who did not leave a prolific
portfolio and spoke only occassionally, if at all, for
2the public record. Nevertheless, these individuals 
collectively had an impact on American history. Often 
their single surviving record is their roll-call record 
in the Congressional Globe or the Congressional 
Record. This vital record will reveal, with careful 
analysis, the legislator's behavior on the issues that 
passed through the Congress.
Quantitative analysis lends itself very nicely to my 
particular subject and clearly gives strong support for 
my hypothesis, that the Democratic Party blocked the 
statehood quest of Dakota Territory and that Republicans 
supported the territory the entire time. Rice-Beyle 
cluster-bloc analysis compares the voting records of one 
member of a given legislative body with each of the other 
members, in a set of pairwise comparisons that estab­
lishes the degree of similarity of their patterns. The 
pairwise comparisons are scored by percentage of 
agreement and are plotted on a matrix. Those who voted 
together at a specified level of agreement, here at least 
seventy percent, are isolated into blocs. Fringe members 
of a particular bloc may also be determined and included,
8
here those who voted with a least fifty percent of the 
bloc members, at least seventy percent of the time.
Investigation of the Fiftieth Congress, 1888-1889, 
is necessary because it was this Congress that ultimately 
allowed Dakota Territory to organize into two states. I 
used two sets of roll calls. First, because the 
Democratic majority in the House of Representatives 
failed repeatedly to secure statehood for Dakota, whereas 
the Republican majority in the Senate passed its version 
of the bill, it is clear Democrats in the House were 
holding up the action. Therefore, I chose twelve 
pertinent roll calls that dealt specifically with Dakota 
Territory to investigate those individuals who either 
supported or opposed the plan. Second, I ran my program 
on the entire United States Congress of 1888-1889, 
including both the House and the Senate. This aided the 
second purpose of this thesis, which is to examine the 
extent to which partisanship played a role in politics in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Rice-Beyle 
cluster-bloc analysis gave me explicit results which 
helped to substantiate my original hypothesis. The 
quantitative analysis added a new dimension to my 
research and it likewise exposed me to an unfamiliar 
approach to historical research.^
The historiography of this particular period of 
Dakota Territorial History is far from complete. I have
9used contemporary histories, most importantly, George W. 
Kingsbury, History of Dakota Territory, 2 vols.
(Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1915),
hereinafter referred to as History; Compendium of 
History and Biography of North Dakota Containing a 
History of North Dakota . . . (Chicago: George A. Ogle 
and Company, 1900), hereinafter referred to as 
Compendium; Clement A. Lounsberry, North Dakota History 
and People: Outlines of American History, 3 vols. 
(Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1917), herein­
after referred to as North Dakota History; Lewis F. 
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 3 vols. (Chicago and 
New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1931); 
and Doane Robinson, History of South Dakota, 3 vols. 
(Chicago: B. F. Bowen & Company, 1904).
Some of these authors had first hand experience in 
territorial politics and the statehood issue. There is 
no doubt when we read Col. Clement A. Lounsberry, editor 
of the Bismarck Tribune, or George W. Kingsbury, of the 
Yankton Press and Dakotan, that their true intention 
was to leave a very detailed record of events in the 
territory. However, it is equally apparent that they had 
a strong prejudice against outsiders, whether Washington 
politicians or transplanted territorial officials. 
Furthermore, writers from the southern part of the 
territory expressed sentiment sympathic to their
10
particular region and the same can be said of northern 
Dakota writers. The distance between the northern 
section and the southern section caused an absence of 
communication which, in turn, intensified mutual distrust 
between the two areas. These writers clearly reflect the 
prevailing views of the respective parts of the 
territory. It is most interesting to follow events in 
Dakota and to find frequent and considerable discrep­
ancies between the sources. Later histories, notably few 
and far between, do not devote many pages to statehood.
It seems a quick run-down of the facts and dates satis­
fied the authors. However, there are two exceptional 
modern studies, Herbert S. Schell, History of South 
Dakota, 3rd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1975); and Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North 
Dakota (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966).  ^
The following chapters will discuss events in the 
area of Dakota up to statehood in 1889. I will delineate 
what the sources indicated had occurred and their 
interpretation of events. I will also point out 
contradictions in their conclusions, adding the results 
of my quantitative research. This will result in a 
concise re-interpretation of the statehood issue in 
Dakota Territory.
1 > William M. Neil, "The American Territorial System
Since the Civi War: A Summary Analysis," Indiana
Magazine of History 60 (September 1964):237-38,
hereinafter referred to as "The American Territorial
System." Neil contends that although this seems to be a
long period of time, especially for the territorial
residents, the average period states had to wait for
admittance into the union between 1787 and 1912 was
approximately twenty years. However, the blatant
political maneuverings apparent in the Dakota issue
overshadow Neil's calculations.
pMany of the speeches found in legislative records 
were re-written to sound better, providing inadequate and 
often misleading clues as to how a legislator felt about 
a particular issue. When voting time came, the roll-call 
best indicated the congressman's true intentions. See 
Richard E. Beringer, Historical Analysis; Contemporary 
Approaches to Clio's Craft (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1 978 ), p"p - 287-88, hereinafter referred to as Historical.
^Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and 
Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 60-
67. See also Beringer, Historical, pp. 193-201, 287-306.
^The most important examination of territories in 
general is by Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the 
United States: 1861-1890; Studies in Colonial Administra­
tion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
for the American Historical Association, 1947), herein­
after referred to as Territories. Equally important is 
Jack E. Eblen, The First and Second United States 
Empires; Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968),
hereinafter referred to as First and Second Empires.
The Dakota Territorial PapeFs (microfilm), Department of 
Special Collections, University of North Dakota, Grand 
Forks, hereinafter cited as Dakota Territorial Papers, 
are useful for events occurring in the territory. The 
Congressional Globe and Congressional Record offer the 
debates in the United States House and Senate.
There are only three useful articles concerning the 
Omnibus Bill that admitted North and South Dakota to the 
Union: Carroll Gardner Green, "The Struggle of South
Dakota to Become a State," South Dakota Historical 
Collections 12 (1 924 ):503-540, hereinafter referred to as 
"The Struggle of South Dakota"; Frederic Logan Paxson, 
"Admission of the 'Omnibus States,' 1889-1890," Wisconsin 
State Historical Society Proceedings 59 (1911):77-96,
12
hereinafter referred to as "Omnibus States'"; and Robert 
Edwin Albright, "Politics and Public Opinion in the 
Western Statehood Movement of the 1880's," The Pacific 
Historical Review 3 (September 1934):296-30^ hereinafter 
referred to as "Politics and Public Opinion." The best 
comprehensive political text on Dakota Territory is by 
Howard Roberts Lamar, Dakota Territory, 1861-1889; A 
Study of Frontier Politics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1956). This book is invaluable to any person 
studying the Dakotas. Hereinafter it will be referred to 
as Dakota Territory. Harold E. Briggs, Frontiers of 
the Northwest, A History of the Upper Missouri Valley 
(New York: D.A. Appleton-Century Co., 19^0), hereinafter 
referred to as Frontiers of the Northwest, presents an 
excellent economic view.
CHAPTER I I
THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM
In the past 200 years, the United States Government 
maintained over one half of the country as territories. 
Stretching from the Appalachians westward to the Pacific 
Ocean, this entire area was ruled under similar forms of 
territorial government at one time or another.^
Generally, western territories were held in 
territorial status much longer than eastern terri­
tories.2 Between 1858 and 1867, five territories were 
added to the Union as new states; however, from 1867 to 
1889 only one state (Colorado in 1876) was admitted.3 
One can only assume the older states jealously guarded 
precious statehood and were reluctant to bring in new 
states that would reduce their political strength. A few 
of the more populous states also rejected the idea of 
’thinly settled' areas having equal representation in the 
Senate.^
The criteria for admitting new states into the Union 
went through a change from 1861 to 1889. Prior to the 
Civil War, territories were apparently admitted to the
13
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Union in pairs in order to maintain the balance between 
free states and slave states. After the Civil War, the 
states were admitted or not admitted based on the desire 
of the parties in power in the House and the Senate to 
maintain their numerical advantage in Congress. Unless a 
political party controlled both the House and Senate, a 
territory ran the risk that statehood would be approved 
in one house yet ignored in the other. Consequently, a 
state either had to wait until its party gained an 
advantage in both houses of Congress or until another 
territory of the opposite political persuasion would be 
available for admittance at the same time. The latter 
action would thereby maintain the existing party balance 
in the Senate, therefore the status quo would be 
perpetuated.
Dakota Territory, along with the other western 
territories, was subject to the colonial status 
authorized by the Ordinance of 1787, often called the 
Northwest Ordinance, the principles of which were 
frequently extended beyond the original Northwest 
Territory.  ^ Using an old pre-revolutionary British 
model utilizing a fully centralized, non-democratic, 
colonial government, the Ordinance was further 
established by the Wisconsin Territorial Act of 1836.^ 
This preliminary stage of government was to be temporary, 
lasting only until the people were allowed and were able
15
to take over for themselves. It was to provide a 
learning experience for the inhabitants, gradually 
guiding the territory through several stages of colonial 
dependency.^
The organized territory was placed in the care of 
the President, who would appoint all government 
officials. The Secretary of State (Secretary of Interior 
after 1873) approved and oversaw the appointees, and the 
Congress allocated funds needed to pay the expenses of
Othe territorial legislative sessions. This 
arrangement, on the surface, appeared to meet all the 
requirements necessary to govern the territories 
properly; however, an unsystematic policy prevailed. The 
President, authorized to appoint the officials, was often 
too busy with the affairs of national government to 
investigate personally the qualifications of his nominees 
for the territorial positions. Therefore, he had to rely 
on individual congressmen, who exercised their influence 
by suggesting their choices for the assignments. An 
additional area of neglect was the day-to-day supervision 
of the correspondence and administrative details 
pertaining to the territories. Reports were handled and 
processed by mere clerks in the Department of State, 
never receiving the full attention of the proper
administrators.
16
Congressional involvement did not usually go beyond 
confirmation of officials and appropriation of funds for 
the territory. Congressmen too found little time to 
oversee operations effectively; occasionally inaccurate 
and uninformed, they dictated to the territorial assembly 
which laws could and should be acted upon. The 
congressional committees on the territories were often 
the territories’ only contact with the legislative 
process. As indicated by the name, the committees 
received reports from the territory and were responsible 
for passing on information to the House and Senate. 
However, these bodies frequently neglected their duties; 
often the territorial reports were all but ignored.
It was unfortunate there was no comprehensive terri­
torial policy. Equally regrettable was the apparent lack 
of interest by those individuals, namely the weak 
Presidents, secretaries of the Interior, and congressmen, 
who were supposed to protect the interests of the 
powerless, disenfranchised citizens.^
Under the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
three political stages were to be followed to insure 
proper internal development. The first, an extremely 
autocratic stage, called for the appointment, by the 
President, of a governor, three judges, and a secretary. 
Answerable to Congress and ultimately the President,
17
1 othe governor became a very powerful figure.
Intermediary between Washington and the territory, he 
controlled local politics. He also held veto power over 
the local legislature, headed Indian affairs, and 
commanded the local militia. The territorial chief 
executive appointed aides and civil officials, collected 
taxes, divided counties, called elections, organized 
townships, erected buildings, picked out the location of 
the capital, defined judicial districts, and was the 
principal administrator of all finance.11
Under the supervision of the Department of Justice, 
three judges were assigned to insure justice in the 
unsettled land. In addition, a secretary and minor aides 
were sent to set up the bureaucracy.1 On the whole, 
the judges and the secretary were pale members of the 
management team in comparison to the governor.
As soon as the territory attained a total population 
of 5,000 people, stage two could be set in motion. Here 
the territorial residents could participate in government 
by electing a bicameral assembly. Settlers could now 
extend their influence beyond the local level. However, 
delegates’ deliberations in the territorial assembly 
still were subject to the approval of the governor and
1 OCongress. J
18
The second stage of development also established the 
office of the territorial delegate, who became the most 
prominent official. Living in Washington, the terri­
torial delegate represented the territory in the United 
States House of Representatives as a non-voting member.
He could debate in the House and attempt to influence 
legislation by personally approaching key members of 
Congress, who, in turn, would presumably vote favorably 
on vital territorial issues. Territorial constituents 
regarded him as head of his party because they felt he 
was in a position to influence federal patronage for 
Dakota; he was, for all practical purposes, accepted as 
their protector in Congress."*1* Given the fact that 
national politics frequently interfered with his ability 
to affect this patronage, and the fact that Dakota and 
other territories were a long way from Washington, the 
"delegate was important to his constituency because they 
did not know how unimportant he was."1  ^ People failed 
to realize that he was no more than a lobbyist, and that 
he had no legal authority either inside or outside the 
territory, although a strong personality with friends in 
the White House or the party that controlled Congress 
could doubtless influence events for the benefit of his 
constituents if he wished.
Stage three in the territorial plan allowed 
residents to write a constitution, organize a state
19
government, and ask Congress for admission to the Union. 
Sufficient population of at least 60,000 persons, 
developed resources for its support, and the above- 
mentioned constitution were necessary criteria for this 
final stage. Statehood was possible whenever Congress 
gave its approval.1^
The writers of the Northwest Ordinance believed that 
only through the guidance of experienced officials would 
American ideas of loyalty, Union and self-government be 
insured. They did not want any "new” countries springing 
up in the western part of the United States. Besides, 
individuals in the wilds supposedly lacked any training 
in government and state planning, or setting up an 
effective judicial system or taxation program.^
Suprisingly, most territories, including Dakota, 
were governed quite well during their formative, 
educational years. Often the lack of direction from 
Washington forced individuals in the territory to band 
together collectively and formulate their own policy. 
This, in turn, gave rise to an independent citizenry that 
was reluctant to accept guidance from national political 
parties or territorial officials. This independence 
consequently spurred harsh criticism of the transplanted 
officials. Many leaders truly were unfair, dishonest, or 
opportunist, only using the territorial stint as a
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stepping stone for more lucrative offices down the 
1 8road. Democratic Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of 
Indiana is quoted as saying specifically about the 
territorial governor:
The Govenor of a Territory, as is known to 
Senators, is appointed almost altogether from 
political considerations. The office itself is 
political in its character, and there can be no 
objection to the appointment of a man because 
of political considerations, as we now under­
stand these matters. He goes to the Territory 
expecting that appointment as Governor of the 
Territory to be a stepping-stone either to the 
House of Representatives or to the Senate. He 
administers his office with a view to that. He 
is a candidate for Congress from the day he 
goes there, is a candidate for Senate from the 
day he goes there. ^
Washington politicians, eager to build strong political 
machines in the territories, often chose their officials 
with an eye for obedience rather than for getting the 
most qualified man. The result was the appointment of
"office seekers and party hacks and not future Presidents
POand national heroes." Throughout the territorial 
period in Dakota, these identical problems propelled the 
citizens to try to enter the Union as a state. They were 
constantly trying to be heard in Washington, and to 
overcome their powerless political situation; yet the 
political party in control of the House, the Democrats, 
was unsupportive of their needs.
In defense of the officials, they often arrived from 
the east with little knowledge of the area or the
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particular problems of the inhabitants. Often they were 
all but forgotten by the national government and they 
received little or no thanks in the territory. Federal 
salaries were very poor, forcing officials to scratch for 
a bare living or to travel east repeatedly to maintain 
previously established business interests. The statement 
by Republican Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas about 
problems caused by poor salaries in the Territory of 
Wyoming applied equally to other territories:
I see that this bill provides that the 
chief justice and associate justices shall have 
a salary of $1,800 a year. I submit whether 
you can expect to have any justice administered 
by a man who will serve in this Territory for 
$1,800 a year. Certainly a salary of $1,800 is 
inadequate for a judge in the Territory. . . .
I submit that if you select a man from the 
Territory capable of being chief justice, and 
give him only $1,800 a year, you offer him no 
inducement. That is no inducement for a man to 
go there to fill the position; and if you take 
a man there, it is no inducement for him to 
devote himself exclusively to that office. I 
desire to have proper men to administer 
justice, and I should prefer to have them taken 
from the Territory, if suitable persons can be 
had there; but $1,800 will not command their 
services, and ought not to do so. If you are 
to have justice administered at all, it should 
be administered by competent men, and a decent 
salary should be provided for them. 1
Nevertheless, the territorial experience was
basically positive. Good and bad politicians both helped
mold a wild, unsettled land into a prosperous,
independent commonwealth. Considering the large area
involved and the small pockets of population, this type
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of administration fared very well given the fact that 
these factors would tax the most efficient government.
When statehood became a reality, it was a mere formality
22as the machinery had been in place for many years.
Further discussion of the unpopular transplanted 
officials will follow in the section dealing with the 
final push for statehood.
In conclusion, the territorial situation that 
existed throughout the nation, including the Territory of 
Dakota, was difficult to live under yet also beneficial. 
Territorial status was undesirable to those who lived 
under its control. In Dakota, the settlers were 
constantly trying to break away from the powerless ward 
status applied by Congress. Unfortunately, they were 
unsuccessful for many years due to an unsympathetic 
Democratic Party in Washington.
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CHAPTER III
YEARS OF DIVISION AND NEGLECT
In order to understand the events in the final 
intensive years leading to statehood for Dakota 
Territory, it is necessary to study the history of the 
entire area.
The area known today as North and South Dakota has 
gone through numerous changes in inhabitants, boundaries, 
and even names. Before white men invaded the wide 
prairie, Indian tribes were the sole dwellers in the 
area. Mandan, Arikara, and Hidatsa chose a settled 
agricultural-based economy while the more volatile Dakota 
or Sioux, Crees, and Assiniboin lived nomadically, 
gathering in the wild and hunting. 1
European pretensions to ownership of the land 
started when Robert Cavelier Sieur de La Salle claimed it 
for France in 1682. Thereafter it passed to Spain in 
1763 then back to France in 1801. The United States 
finally bought the section commonly known as the 
Louisiana Purchase for $15 million dollars from Napoleon
pin 1 803- The northeastern section, which is drained
by the Red River of the North, was taken by Henry Hudson
27
28
for the British in 1610 and they turned it into a very 
profitable trapping area. The United States gained 
possession at the 49th parallel in 1818 under the 
conditions of a treaty with the British.^
The southern half of the Louisiana Purchase became 
the territory of Orleans in 1803, leaving the north 
called the District of Louisiana. The entire area that 
eventually became Dakota Territory was included in every 
other territory in the northwest from the years 1 8 0 3 to 
1861. The boundaries changed as new territories were 
formed or existing territories subdivided preparatory to 
statehood. In 1812, the area west of the Missouri River 
lay with the territory of Missouri, later called 
Nebraska. The area east of the Missouri and White Earth 
Rivers was included with Michigan Territory in 1834. 
Dakota went to Wisconsin Territory in 1836, Iowa 
Territory in 1838 and Minnesota Territory in 1849. In 
1858, Minnesota became a new state and the area between 
its western boundary and the Missouri River did not 
belong to any state or organized territory until Dakota 
became a territory in 1861. At this point Dakota 
embraced 350,000 square miles, and included the present- 
day states of North Dakota, South Dakota, a large part of 
Montana, the northern one-half of Wyoming, a small part 
of east-central Idaho, and a small part of northern 
Nebraska. Between 1863 and 1882, the Territories of
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Idaho (1863), Montana (1864 and 1873), Wyoming (1868) and 
Nebraska (1882) were established, taking western and 
southern sections of Dakota. In the final boundary 
decision, Dakota was left with 149,000 square miles.^
The first contact Indians had with the white people 
came with the fur traders. Trapping proved to be an 
excellent source of income, with an almost limitless 
supply of animals. After the Lewis and Clark Expedition 
early in the 1800's, more traders filtered into the 
area. Large fur companies set up permanent trading posts 
on the major rivers. Initially, the posts drew backwoods­
men and Indians to trade the furs for staple goods and 
supplies, but as the fur companies discovered the 
potential growth of the area, they soon promoted 
settlement for businessmen, farmers, and investors. The 
small trading posts turned out to be the hubs of 
political activity during the early territorial years.^ 
Starting as an obscure, unsettled section of the 
United States, Dakota, even before territorial status, 
had already experienced numerous changes. As settlements 
pushed into the area, economic, political, and develop­
mental problems had to be solved. It follows that large 
investors from outside the territory ultimately gave the 
region the impetus needed to attract permanent pioneers.
Residents of neighboring states took a keen interest 
in the unidentified area within the Big Sioux, Red, and
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Missouri Rivers. Capitalists from Minnesota, Iowa, 
Missouri, and Illinois eyed the unsettled land with great 
anticipation, seeing latent opportunities. The land 
speculators and railroad expansionists developed effec­
tive organizations to promote the land in such a manner 
that potential agricultural settlers would want to 
migrate into the area. Besides directly inviting farmers 
and businessmen, the large companies also realized that 
an additional source of profit could be reaped if careful 
control was maintained over the expected territorial 
government. The ultimate center of government, i.e. the 
territorial capital, must be controlled if federal funds 
and influence on the novice government were to be worth­
while. The large territory was settled sporadically.
This led to different areas of influence, fragmentation, 
and disunity occurring from the first notion of settle­
ment. This theme of disunity manifested itself 
repeatedly throughout the territorial days.
Three distinct settlements competed for the chance 
to be the force responsible for influencing Congress to 
grant territorial status to the uncharted prairie. 
Pembina, the first townsite and also the oldest, was 
comprised of Metis (part Indian and part French) and fur 
traders. Its close proximity to Canada and its 
importance as a trading center meant Pembina served as a 
vital link between Winnipeg and St. Paul. Always an
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independent group, the people of Pembina were eager for 
territorial status and wanted a share of the potential 
profits generated from additional settlers. A 
territorial capital would assure the additional growth. 
They believed there was also a chance two territories 
might be formed out of the large area and their 
settlement was an excellent choice for the capital of the 
northern half.^
The second area, Yankton, was dominated by two 
individuals, General Daniel M. Frost of St. Louis and 
Captain John B. S. Todd of Illinois and Kentucky. They 
were the founders of the Frost-Todd Trading Company and 
the Upper Missouri Land Company, both of which engaged in 
establishing trading and supply centers, building boom 
towns, and acquiring parcels of land. The desire to make 
considerable profits was the basic reason Todd and Frost 
firmly supported the coming of the territory. They 
wanted to reap the benefits of a booming economy and 
control the political arena. They prompted their fellow 
neighbors to petition congress for territorial status in 
1859 and 1860, but their pleas were unsuccessful.^
Settlement number three, gathering around the town 
of Sioux Falls, was not to be undone by the Frost-Todd 
faction. Settlers here were fully supported by the state 
of Minnesota, which assisted them in attempting to set up 
a territorial government. Delegates were sent to
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Congress along with the proper petitions; however, 
Congress politely ignored them. Placement of the 
territorial capital in Sioux Falls would be of great 
financial benefit to the area.^ As it turned out, 
petitions from the frontier were not taken seriously; the 
presidential election of 1860 was in the offing, and the 
prospects of rebellion preoccupied Congress. It was 
apparent that all legislation was secondary to the 
question of slavery. The North, of course, mostly 
adverse to slavery, was most interested in organizing 
new, free territories which would, in turn, fortify the 
Union. The South, on the other hand, was not enthralled 
with the idea of additional, pro-northern, loyalist 
territories. Therefore, it presented solid opposition on 
the territorial question.^
In 1860 a final appeal for territorial status was 
brought before the United States House and Senate. At 
this point, most southern states had withdrawn from 
Congress; they had anticipated the split in the Union 
which ultimately led to the Civil War. This same group 
had expressed the most objections to establishing 
additional territories. 1 0 It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the territorial bill easily passed both 
houses, receiving Senate approval on February 26 and 
House approval on March 1, 1861. On March 2, 1861, 
President Buchanan established the Territory of Dakota
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under the guidelines of the Organic Act set forth by 
11Congress.
In 1861, the newly formed Dakota Terriotry was an 
enormous area, largely unsettled, and teeming with 
hostile Indians who were vigorously defending their 
shrinking land. Initial growth was significantly 
hindered by national events. Not only was the United 
States slowly recovering from the depression brought on 
by the financial panic of 1857, but also, as the economy 
recovered, the nation became engaged in the Civil War; 
this was followed by the painful process of recovery, 
after which the country was hit again by economic depres­
sion. 1 2 Until these national problems could be solved, 
Dakota Territory remained a remote area that drew little 
attention. Development was postponed almost a 
decade.13
Disunity and disharmony plagued Dakota throughout 
the early years. Even the few brave and willing settlers 
who did venture into Dakota Territory encountered 
numerous problems during the 1860's. A good transporta­
tion system, essential to any state or territory, was 
critical to Dakota Territory because of its sheer size 
and inaccessibility. Not only did individuals have 
difficulty reaching the territory, but when they arrived, 
the railroads ended and roads became mere paths. Travel 
on steamboats was also limited because the territory
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lacked adequate loading facilities and suffered from
1 iiperiodic low water.
Climatic extremes also played a role in deterring 
pioneers. Settlers in Dakota suffered from extremely 
cold temperatures and blizzards during the long winters, 
while the hot summers often produced drought and prairie 
fires. Crop failures during the 1860's were commonplace 
due to scant rainfall and grasshopper plagues. Shortages 
of food and clothing taxed the people, and a lack of 
timber threatened their supply of fuel and building 
materials. These physical hardships were difficult 
enough, but an added torment was the constant threat of 
hostile Indians. Settlers often lived in isolated 
pockets with only a limited number of soldiers in a few 
equally isolated garrisons to suppress any attacks.
Hardy souls who braved the hardships often grew 
tired of fighting the elements and left Dakota for more 
congenial places to live. One temporary settler in the 
area, Army surgeon Dr. Noah M. Glatfelter, described the 
prairie to his wife who remained "safe" back east:
Treeless, and all along here, grassless 
prairies, produces to the traveller an aspect 
the dreariest, bleakest and most forsaken 
imaginable and the mind wonders in vain, 
whether truly this region was likewise created 
for some useful purpose. Travelling here, it 
makes your mouth water to see a tree, does your 
heart good to obtain sight of a place of abode, 
be it ever so rude, and you are readily
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disposed to hail and make friends with all , 
living things, whether man, beast, or bird. °
Other potential settlers heard the rumors of the "Great
American Desert" and chose other places to make their
homes. The famous western painter, George Catlin, wrote
that the Dakotas were a part of that region known as the
Great Plains, "which is and ever must be useless to
civilized men to cultivate." 1 ^ Established states,
such as Minnesota and Iowa, competed with Dakota for
European and eastern United States immigrants relocating
in the west. There was no need to venture into Dakota
when good, fertile, agricultural land was available in
1 ftmore "civilized" states en route. °
To sum up the situation, the Civil War, unfavorable 
but accurate propaganda, Indian uprisings, crop failures, 
blizzards, droughts, and an inadequate transportation 
system seriously retarded growth in Dakota Territory 
during the 1860’s. It seemed that the delays occurring 
in the territory were endless. Not only were settlers 
unprepared for the climatic and economic problems, they 
were powerless to do much about the situation. Time and 
time again, the Dakotans were subject to problems beyond 
their control.
As it turns out, Dakotans were forced to wait for 
change in events inside and outside the territory. The 
gloomy facts were finally turned around by the late
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1 860 ’s with the advent of a great population and economic 
boom. Five factors changed the discouraging situation of 
the earlier period: 1) an end to the Civil War, 2) 
peaceful contact with the Indians, 3) agricultural 
success, 4) improved transportation lines, and 5) the 
discovery of gold in the Black Hills of southern Dakota.
Dakota desperately needed money, goods, and 
confidence to build a strong economic base. The end of 
the Civil War triggered rapid economic growth in the
northern half of the United States that generated invest
ment capi tal for speculation in r ailroads and manufac-
turing piants in the north, and land companies and more
railroads in the terr itor ies •
Railroads anid capital pour ing into the territory
would be of 1 ittle use if peaceful relations between the
settlers and the Indians had not been established. At
first, bloodless association with the Indians seemed
elusive, f or pioneers pushed far ther west despite the
fact the Indians had clear title to the land. Gradually
small trading posts grew into major centers of popula­
tion, usually on the fringe or within the boundaries of 
the Indian lands. It is no surprise that hostile 
confrontations between eager settlers and indignant 
natives were frequent and bloody, as the settlers moved 
onto Indian land and then called upon the United States 
military to protect their homesteads from the angry
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Indians. The Indians, in turn, were pushed westward and 
rightly fought to retain their lands; however, they were 
no match for gold miners and land-hungry homesteaders.
The subsequent wars and numerous treaties limited the 
Indians' mobility and weakened their resistence. In the 
end, the independent natives were appointed wards of the 
United States Government and were forced to live on 
restrictive reservations with promises that the govern­
ment would help them start farming. Now the settlers 
could feel safe on "their land" on the prairie. As 
territorial resident Moses Armstrong precisely stated, 
"here begins the date of permanent settlement in Dakota, 
when the retreating Red face look back upon the advancing 
sentinels of civilization who had come to subdue the 
wilds and adorn the rivers with thriving villages." 
Peaceful relations were imposed, rather than earned, but 
they were achieved nonetheless. ?
Successful agricultural development likewise spurred
population growth. Obviously, the majority of the people
finding their way to Dakota wanted land for agricultural
purposes. After the discouragement of eight years of
poor crops and drought, increased moisture and subsidence
of grasshopper plagues encouraged many farmers to migrate
2 0to Dakota who had previously rejected the notion.
Boastful settlers sent letters back east and abroad 
telling relatives and friends of the wonderful
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opportunities in Dakota. Relatively little enticement
was necessary, however, for eastern lands were becoming
increasingly expensive, in short supply, and subject to
high taxes. Dakota, on the other hand, offered flat,
treeless land with relatively low taxes at a favorable
rate of interest. Under the Pre-emption Act of 1841,
land was cheap, and became free under liberal provisions
of the Homestead Act of 1862, or available at low prices
P 1from the railroads. Additional acres could be
claimed under the Timber Culture Act of 1873. Eager
settlers took advantage of these various means of
acquiring land and the number of acres settled increased
dramatically.^ 3 Farmers practiced diversification of
both livestock and cereal grains. New strains of
resiliant grains were tested as were inovative milling
practices. This led to the development of hard spring
?4wheat, Dakota’s greatest agricultural product.
Improved transportaion also played a vital role in 
the development of Dakota Territory. The paths followed 
by settlers were first trod by Indians, and were 
gradually widened to accommodate wagons and stage and 
freight lines.^ Utilizing the major river systems, 
the Missouri and Red, steamboats provided an alternate 
mode of transporat ion. Often a combination system of Red 
River carts, stage coaches, and steamboats were 
employed.
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The decisive factor in the transport problem rested 
with the railroads. They brought Dakota its greatest 
commodity, people. Thousands of migrants from the 
eastern United States and Europe traveled across the 
prairie, and all were eager for land. Cars loaded with 
families and belongings dropped pioneers in the territory 
and took surplus agricultural products back to needy 
eastern markets. ^  A strip of settlement lined the 
tracks of railroads. Towns logically grew in locations 
where transportation was established, elevators were 
built to store grain before it was shipped east, and new 
businesses peddled articles of necessity that came in 
with regularity.
The railroads linked Indian agencies, military
posts, mining camps, and railroad construction camps with
major population areas that, in turn, provided profitable
markets for the territorial farmers. The increase in
rail miles directly affected the economic situation in 
P ftDakota. ° The rails closed the gap between the 
frontier and the east. The St. Paul and Pacific 
stretched from St. Cloud, Minnesota, to Breckenridge, 
Minnesota, in 1871; Dakota's first railroad, the Northern 
Pacific, reached Fargo in 1871 and Bismarck in 1873.
James J. Hill built his Great Northern Railway across the 
northern half of Dakota, starting from Grand Forks in 
1880. There was direct competition between this railroad
40
and the Northern Pacific. A branch of the Chicago and 
Northwestern, the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad, joined 
the Dakota Southern in 1873, linking the east with 
Yankton.^
The railroads were the territory's greatest propa­
ganda machines. They placed numerous advertisements in 
eastern newspapers and magazines promoting the virtues of 
beautiful Dakota. Europeans also received representa­
tives and ample literature to entice them to choose 
Dakota as their new home.3° The railroads furnished 
the pioneers a link with the east, supplied stability in 
wilderness, and maintained continuity under often 
difficult living conditions.
Transportation and settlement were both stimulated 
by the discovery of gold in 1874 on the banks of French 
Creek near the town of Custer in the Black Hills. 
Thousands of people migrated to the gold fields, 
including not only miners, but speculators and business­
men as well. New railroads were used to transport gold 
and other products out of the Hills and take staple goods 
back in. Gold not only brought wealth to the Territory 
but attracted many settlers who never made it to the gold 
mines. Many stopped along the way to take up farming or 
other business interests; others came to mine the miners, 
including some farmers, who realized that the Black Hills 
would serve as a new market for them to sell their
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crops. Lawyers and merchants also found a ready market 
for their services and goods.
Despite these elements promoting growth, however, 
government did not develop as quickly as it should have. 
During the early years of slow growth, and in the later 
period as well, national politics directly affected the 
economic and political situation in the territory, but 
without much reference to the actual needs of the local 
inhabitants. The party in power in Washington, or more 
clearly, the President and Congress, were responsible for 
the political appointments and oversaw territorial opera­
tions.-^ Thus, territorial politics were shaped by the 
needs of eastern politicians. The party sent these loyal 
servants and naturally expected the territory would be 
administered properly, according to party policy. 3^
President Abraham Lincoln appointed his trusted 
friend, William Jayne of Illinois, as the first governor 
of Dakota Territory in 1861. Jayne approached the 
territory with his retinue of henchmen, all setting up 
residence in Y a n k t o n . T h e  first problem for the new 
governor was the selection of the capital city. Three 
rival towns - Yankton, Vermillion, and Bon Homme - 
competed for the seat of government. Such heated debates 
took place in the assembly that the Dakota Cavalry was 
called into Yankton to insure peace. Yankton 
triumphantly won the seat of the territorial capital in
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1862 and, as a trade off, Vermillion was promised the 
university of the Territory, and Bon Homme, the 
penitentiary .^ 5
Jayne’s other tasks included organization of govern 
ment, the framework taken from the Organic Act and 
lasting the the next eighteen years. He took the census 
enacted civil and criminal codes, established a revenue, 
organized the local militia, defined the limits of the 
assembly, drew county boundaries, established judicial 
districts and set up school sections in the townships. 
Bureaucratic employees included specifically the 
secretary, chief justice, associate justices, federal 
district attorney, U.S. Marshal, commissioner of rail­
roads, and surveyor general. Postmasters and Indian 
agents were also engaged.^
Although the governor exercised tremendous 
authority, local residents did have a small voice in 
territorial politics. Control of county and township 
affairs was maintained by the elections held on the 
precinct, county, district, and township levels for the 
registers of deeds, county commissioners, sheriffs, 
judges of probate, county attorney, surveyors, coroners, 
superintendents of schools, justices of the peace, and 
constables. More importantly, the representatives sent 
to the territorial assembly and the congressional 
delegate who served in Washington were elected by Dakota
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settlers who, in turn, expected their demands be 
remembered and, if possible, fulfilled. ^
The first elections in the territory brought forth a 
group of men who were, more than likely, unfamiliar with 
politics. The first territorial assemblies proved to be 
unruly, and included many inexperienced young men with 
little or no knowledge of proper legislative 
proceedings. These unseasoned assemblages spent consider­
able time deliberating minor topics that delayed 
discussion of more pertinent t o p i c s . O n  occassion, 
some prominent issues, such as the removal of the capital 
and territorial division, were discussed with heated 
emotions. The assembly proposed tax revenues, locations 
of territorial institutions, development of the economy, 
and inducements for potential settlers. Deliberations 
also included discussions of Indian policy, women's 
suffrage, creation and organization of counties and 
county seats, prohibition, land fraud, and railroad 
issues, such as taxation and land ownership.^9 
However, the assembly lacked autonomy, as its actions 
were always subject to the governor's consent. He could 
and did occasionally overrule or intervene at his 
discretion, regardless of the issue. His veto power 
stifled the assembly and further aggravated the dislike 
of "foreign" rule.2^
The early political parties, plagued by factional 
feuds and obscure ideologies, were often led by 
charismatic individuals who appealed to the common man. 
They tended to make big promises. Strict party adherance 
was yet to come; bribery and vote buying were all too 
frequent an occurrence. The settlers nonetheless were 
extremely active participants in the entire political 
arena, becoming zealously involved in local politics. 
National elections were followed with dedication as 
Dakotans, although unable to vote, were fully aware that 
the national scene directly affected events back home in 
the territory.^
Dakota Territory survived the lean years of the 
1 8 6 0 's, endured the undefined economic and political 
experimentation of the 1 8 7 0 's, and anticipated the long 
struggle for statehood in the 1880's. The settlements, 
few and far between, worked against unity in the 
territory. Sectional rivalry, coupled with an 
unsympathetic Congress in Washington, meant years of 
frustration. Statehood was foremost in the mind of the 
people in the territory for over eighteen years. The 
following chapters discuss the major problems and 
individuals involved in the statehood movement.
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^Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota, 3rd 
ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp. 
15-23; Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North Dakota,
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, l"9 6 6), pp. IT-
26.
“^Treaty Series, Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and 
Other International Acts of the United State of Amer­
ica, vol. T, (1931 ), No"I gTTJ ’’Treaty for' the Cession of 
Louisiana,” 30 April 1803, pp. 498-511. In the same 
volume, see also "Convention for the Payment of Sixty 
Million Francs ($11,250,000) by the United States," No. 
86a, 30 April 1803, pp. 512-15. A third treaty 
concerning France can be found in the same volume listed 
as "Convention for the Payment of Sums Due by France to 
Citizens of the United States," No. 86b, 30 April 1803,
pp . 51 6-28.
^Ibid., "Convention signed at London," No. 112, 20 
October 1818, pp. 658-62. Additional sources included 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 
People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Educational 
Division Meredith Corporation, 1970), pp. 159-60; History 
of the Red River Valley, Past and Present, 2 vols.
(Chicago: C^  F~. Cooper and Company, 1 90 9), 1:453, herein­
after referred to as History of the Red River Valley; 
Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, p. 13.
D^akota, An Act to Provide Temporary Government 
for the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of 
Surveyor-General Therein, Laws of Dakota, ( 1 862):2 1;
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the 
Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of Surveyor 
General Therein, Statutes at Large 12, 239-^ (i8 61);
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the 
Territory of Montana, Statutes at Large 13, 85-92 
(1864 ) ;  An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the 
Territory of Wyoming, Statutes at Large 15, 78-83 
(1868 ) ;  Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, p. 31. Idaho 
became a territory Tn 1 8 6 3 , taking part of the present 
day states of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. Montana 
Territory gained another portion from the western part of 
Dakota Territory in 1873; and Nebraska, in 1882, claimed 
a small piece of land in the south. General Laws, and 
Memorials and Resolutions of the Territory of Dakota, 
Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Assembly 
(Yankton, Dakota Territory: Josiah cT Trask, 1862) ,  pp. 
iii-vii. See also Crawford, History of North Dakota, 
1:319;  History of the Red River Valley, p. 453;
Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, pp. 28-31.
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^In 1858 the Ponca and Yankton treaties ceded to 
the United States 16,000,000 acres for a mere 
$2,000,000. The Indians then moved to reservations near
Ft. Randall. Treaty Between the United States of
America, and the Yancton Tribe of Sioux, or Dacotah
Indians. Concluded at Washington, April 19, 1858.
Ratified by the Senate, February 16, 1 859. Proclaimed by
the Presiden t o f the United States , February 26, 1859,
Statutes at Large 1 1 , 743-9 ( 1 858) . Armstrong, Early
Empire Builder s, pp . 13-28; Schell , History of South
Dakota, pp. 49-64; Robinson, History of North Dakota, 
pp . ST-75; Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 146— 
156. The white men also produced the metis or half- 
breed, a group of very tough characters. Most of their 
fathers were French, Canadian, Scottish, or English and 
their mothers were Chippeawa, Cree, or Assiniboin.
^Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 50-54. According 
to Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:40-52, Pembina 
was first settled In 1819. Briggs, Frontiers of the 
Northwest, p. 363, states the Hudson Bay Company made 
arrangements with the U. S. Government to use a route 
from the Great Lakes through Minnesota and Pembina upward 
to Canada. This greatly enhanced Pembina's position as a 
trade center and a potential territorial capital.
\amar, DakotaTerritory, pp. 36-41; Kingsbury, 
History , 1:53^-33; Schell, History of South Dakota, 
pp. 69-77; Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:208-33, 
260; Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 350-61. 
Weston A. Goodspeed, The Province and the States, A 
History of the Province of Lousiana Under France and 
Spain, and of the Territories and States of the United 
States formed Therefrom, 7 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin:
The Western Historical Association, 1904), 6:206-10, 
hereinafter cited as The Province & The States.
Captain John Blair Smith Todd was a graduate of West 
Point, and was originally from Kentucky. Resigning from 
the Army in 1856, he formed the trading company with 
General Frost. A cousin of Mary Tood Lincoln, Todd was 
one of the founding fathers of Yankton. General Daniel 
Marsh Frost was also a West Point graduate. Originally 
from New York, he excelled in business at St. Louis, 
Missouri, before entering the partnership with Todd.
Both men were instrumental in aiding Dakota in becoming a 
territory. Surrounding states that backed the efforts of 
Todd and Frost were Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois.
®The Dakota Land Company exercised the most 
influence in the town, dealing in land speculation.
Lamar, Dakota Territory, p. 41-50; "The Settlement at
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Sioux Falls," Collections of the State Historical Society 
of South Dakota 6 (1912):133-80. Samuel J. Albright,
"The First Organized Goverment of Dakota," Collections of 
the Minnesota Historical Society 8 (1898):129-47.
^Armstrong, Early Empire Bulders, p. 30;
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:259-62; Kingsbury, 
History, 1: 1 6 6 - 6 9; History of the- Red River Valley, 
pp. 45-57; Moses K. Armstrong, Centennial Address on 
Dakota Territory Giving Its Growth, Population, and 
Resources; Delivered at the U. S. Centennial Exhibition 
in Philadelphia on September 28, 1S76 (Philadelphia: J.
FI Lippincott and Co., 1876), pp. 5-7, hereinafter 
referred to as Centennial Exhibition.
1^Compendium of History and Biography of North 
Dakota: Containing a History of North Dakota: Embracing 
an Account of Early Explorations, Early Settlement,
Indian Occupancy, Indian History and Traditions, 
Territorial and State Organization; a Review of the 
Political History; and a Concise History of the Growth 
and Development of the State: Also a Compendium of 
Biography of North Dakota: Containing Biographical 
Sketches of Hundreds of Prominent Old Settlers and 
Representative Citizens of the State, With a Review of 
Their Life Work; Their Identity With the Growth and 
Development of the State; Reminiscences of Personal 
History and Pioneer Life and Other Interesting and 
Valuable Matter Which Should be Preserved in History 
(Chicago: George A. Ogle and Company, 1900), pp. F*T-8 6 ;
hereinafter referred to as Compendium; Armstrong, Early 
Empire Builders, pp. 166-69; Loundsberry, North Dakota 
History, 1:259-62. 1
1 1 U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe,
36th Cong., 2nd sess., 1861, 1:6977 923, 1207-1208, 1337; 
Cong. Globe, 2:1356, 1362. The President had approved 
and signed, "An act (S. No. 562) to provide a temporary 
government for the Territory of Dakota, and to create the 
officer of Surveyor General therein." Laws of Dakota, 
pp. 21-28; and An Act to Provide a Temporary Government 
for the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of 
Surveyor General Therein, 239-
Commencing at a point in the main channel 
of the Red River of the North, where the forty- 
ninth degree of north latitude crosses the 
same; thence up the main channel of the same, 
and along the boundary of the State of 
Minnesota, to Big Stone lake; thence along the 
boundary line of the said State of Minnesota to
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the Iowa line; thence along the boundary line 
of the State of Iowa to the point of intersec­
tion between the Big Sioux and Missouri rivers; 
thence up the Missouri river and along the 
boundary line of the Territory of Nebraska, to 
the mouth of the Niobrara or Running Water 
river; thence following up the same, in the 
middle of the main channel thereof, to the 
mouth of the Keha Paha or Turtle Hill river; 
thence up said river to the forty-third 
parallel of north latitude; thence due west to 
the present boundary of the Territory of 
Washington; thence along the boundary line of 
Washington Territory, to the forty-ninth degree 
of north latitude; thence east along said forty- 
ninth degree of north latitude, to the place of 
beginning, be, and the same is hereby, 
organized into a temporary government, by the 
name of the Territory of Dakota.
According to Armstrong, Centennial Address, p. 8 , "The 
territory did not hear the news [of the new territorial 
status] - [it was so] far removed from rails and 
telegraphs. News did not reach Yankton until 11 days 
after passage of the law."
1 PEspecially hard hit were the land companies and 
railroads, both essential to the development of Dakota 
Territory. Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:259.
^ History of the Red River Valley, pp. 79-80.
1 ^Paxson, "Omnibus States," pp. 77-78.
^Briggs, Frontier of the Northwest, pp. 366-70, 
534-39- After the Sioux Uprising of 1862, it was 
reported that from one-half to three-fourths of the 
farmers in Dakota had left the territory.
^Dr. Noah M. Glatfelter to Mary, July 30, 1865,
Dr. Noah M. Glatfelter, "Letters from Dakota Territory, 
1865," Missouri Historical Society, Saint Louis Bulletin 
1 8 ( 1 9 6 2 ): 1 18.
^References to Catlin can be found in Kingsbury, 
History, 1:338; and Briggs, Frontiers of the North­
west, pp. 368-69. Briggs also contains a small 
quotation from Lieutenant G. K. Warren, who wrote about 
Dakota in his journal, Exploration in the Dakota Country 
in the Year 1855. Warren asserted flatly that "the 
land west of the ninety-seventh meridian was not fit for
49
agricultrual settlement.” With this sort of propaganda, 
it is no surprise Dakota's population grew very slowly. 
See also Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New 
York: Ginn and Co., 1931), pp. 152-60.
1 ftBriggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 366- 
69; Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:253-55; 
Kingsbury, History"! 1: 338; Armstrong, Early Empire 
Builders, p. 54; Paxson, "Omnibus States," pp. 77-78.
^The first parcel of land the government acquired 
to open to white settlers in Dakota was negotiated under 
the treaty of Traverse-de-Sioux, Minnesota. A small 
strip of land, it included the river valley of the Big 
Sioux River, covering the present towns of Sioux Falls, 
Flandreau and McClary, according to Armstrong, Centennial 
Exhibition, pp. 5-7. For important treaties, see the 
Yankton Treaty of 1858 and the Ft. Laramie Treaty of 
1868. Both can be found in Charles J. Kappler, Indian 
Affairs Laws and Treaties, 2 vols. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1903), 2:776-81, 998-1007; 
Armstrong, Centennial Exhibition, pp. 6-7.
POEuropean immigrants came from Scandinavia,
Bohemia, Russia, Scotland, Canada, England, Ireland, and 
Germany, and new world immigrants came from Canada and 
eastern states. They were reputed to be hard-working 
individuals who eagerly tilled the land. Briggs, 
Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 367-69, 387-88, 411-15, 
454-73, 488-96, 539-44; Robinson, History of North 
Dakota, pp. 145-48.
^^An Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers 
on the Public Domain, Statutes at Large 12, 392-94 
(1862); Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 372, 
411-15; "A History of Grasshoppers in Clay County," St. 
Paul Press, 18 July 1874. Lamar, History of North 
Dakota, pp. 137-40, 148-51; see also "Grants of Land By 
Congress, and Charter of the St. Paul and Pacific and of 
the First Division of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad 
Companies," General Railroad Laws of Minnesota and the 
Territory of Dakota (St. Paul, Office of the Pioneer 
Press Co., 1879), PP• 1 83-208.
2 2Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 384;
The Timber Culture Act became law March 3, 1873, to 
encourage the growth of timber on western prairies. 
Provided a person would plant, protect, and keep healthy 
40 acres of timber for 10 years, he received title to the 
quartersection of which the 40 acres were a part. It
50
provided for a maximum of 160 acres. An Act to Encourage 
the Growth of Timber on Western Prairies, Statutes at 
Large 17, 605-606 (1873)- An Act to Encourage the Growth 
of Timber on the Western Prairies, Statutes at Large 
2 0 , 113-15 (1878).
2^From 1862 to 1866, 100,000 acres were settled 
upon; 1866 to 1 8 7 0 , 500,000 acres; 1883, 7 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0; 1889, 
42,000,000 or one-half of Dakota was filed upon (cumula­
tive total). P. F. McClure, Resources of Dakota. An 
Official Publication Compiled by the Commissioner of 
Immigration, Under Authority Granted by the Territorial 
Legislature (Sioux Falls, Dakota: n . p ., 1887), p . 245; 
Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 424.
?4Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 485- 
96, 509-522.
^Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest,
81; Kingsbury, Dakota 2:1188-90; Robinson,
North Dakota, pp. 99-118, 129-32; Schell,
South Dakota, pp. 80-84.
^Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 376;
Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 65-79.
2 ^Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 411—
! 5.
2 ^Ibid., pp. 192-95, 387-88, 411-15; Armstrong,
Early Empire Builders, pp. 37-41; Paxson, "Omnibus 
States, " pp. 78-79j Robinson, History of North Dakota, 
pp. 34-40; Ralph V. Hunkins and John Clark Lindsey, South 
Dakota Its Past, Present, and Future (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1 932), pi El~, hereinafter referred to 
as South Dakota.
2 %riggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 371—
72, 376-83, 416-29; Crawford, History of North Dakota, 
pp. 2 5 6 - 7 2  contains a map showing construction of the 
railroads in North Dakota on p. 256; Kingsbury, History, 
1:534; Paxson, "Omnibus States," pp. 78-79; Robinson, 
History of North Dakota, pp. 122-32; Loundsberry, North 
Dakota History"! 1: 327-4 6.
3°Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 410- 
27; Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 144-45;
Dakota had its own immigration organization, the Bureau 
of Immigration. This body promoted Dakota settlement in 
the east and in Europe. Dakota, Territorial Legislature,
pp. 376- 
History of 
History of
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Senate Journal , 1871, p. 233; Dakota, Territorial 
Legislature, House Journal, 1871, p. 172.
O 1J Schneider, "Taxation in Dakota Territory," pp. 
399-^00; Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, pp. 25-41, 
387-90. There is a postscript to the gold mine situation 
of Dakota Territory. In March 1863, the Territory of 
Idaho was established, carving a small portion of land 
from western Dakota Territory. In May 1864, the 
Territory of Montana was formed, taking more western 
land. In those two years, Dakota lost its two richest 
mining areas and its most populous sections of the 
territory. Armstrong, Centennial Exhibition, p. 11.
3^Lamar, Dakota Territory, p. 14.
33lbid . , p . 69.
3^North Dakota Blue Book (n.p.: Secretary of 
State, 1981), pp. 1 60-67. either officials included John 
Hutchinson, Minnesota, Secretary; Philemon Bliss, Ohio, 
Chief Justice; S. P. Williston, Pennsylvania and J. S. 
Williams, Tennessee, Associate Justices. This source 
lists all Territorial Delegates, Governors, Secretaries, 
Chief Justices, Associate Justices, United States 
Attorneys, United States Marshals, Surveyor Generals, 
Attorney-Generals, Auditors, Treasurers, Superintendents 
of Public Instruction, and Commissioners of Railroads for 
the entire territorial period. In addition, it is an 
excellent reference guide for the members of the 
Territorial Legislature.
Lincoln was so busy with the government and Civil 
War that he did not always appoint officials on the basis 
of merit alone (nor did other Presidents). However, 
considering the political patronage practices of this 
period of American History, it was not within Lincoln's 
power to do anything contrary to established practice. 
Lamar, Dakota Territory, p. 67.
3-*Kingsbury, History, 1:206-09; Loundsberry,
History of Dakota, 1:277-78 .
^Schell, "Politics— Palaver and Polls," in Dakota 
Panorama, p. 188; History of the Red River Valley, 
pp. 47-65; Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp~ 68-73. For a 
complete list and description of the initial public 
servants, see Armstrong, Early Empire Builders, pp. 32- 
34. Also see the 2nd Annual Message of Governor William 
Jayne, Delivered to the Legislative Assembly of Dakota 
Territory, in Joint convention, on Thursday, December 19,
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1 862 (Yankton, Dakota Territory: Kingsbury and Ziebach, 
Public Printers, 1862).
In the first decade, Dakota established a code of 
laws for the territory. It turned out to be a very 
notable set of laws and it was used as a guideline for 
the Territory of Wyoming when it was formed in 1868. 
Republican Senator Jacob M. Howard, of Michigan stated, 
in the Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd sess., 3:2799:
The Territory of Dakota has a very 
respectable code of laws at present, and I 
believe they are very acceptably administered. 
Probably nine tenths of the new Territory is 
carved out of the Territory of Dakota, and the 
people have been accustomed to and well 
acquainted with the laws of the Territory of 
Dakota, while the remainder of the new 
Territory is within the present Territory of 
Utah, wich is governed by a distinct and 
separate code of laws, many of which are very 
peculiar in their nature and very objection­
able. I would therefore adapt the territorial 
code of Dakota to the governemnt of the new 
Territory of Wyoming, so that there shall be 
really but one code of laws in the Territory.
■^According to the Organic Act, any free white 
male, over the age of 2 1 years, who either declared 
allegiance to the U.S. Consitution or was a citizen of 
the country could vote, provided he was a resident of the 
territory. An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for 
the Territory of Dakota, and to Create the Office of 
Surveyor General Therein, 239-44; Lamar, Dakota- 
Territory, ppl ET, 69; Schell, "Politics-Palaver and 
Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp. 93, 98, 102, 208; 
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, pp. 262-68;
Kingsbury, History 1:230-31, 670; Kingsbury, History
2:1  0 2 2 , '\56E~.
^Armstrong states that many assemblyman were 
educated in eastern colleges, including doctors, lawyers, 
and ministers, but frontiersmen were represented too, 
with buckskin suits and long hair. Armstrong, Early 
Empire Builders, p. 52. As Armstrong relates,
In one of these early legislatures my seat 
was near a frontier member and desperado, by 
the name of Jim Somers, who some years after­
wards was shot dead for jumping a claim near 
Chamberlain. I remember vividly the only
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speech Jim made in the Legislature. It was 
short, but full of fire and threats of vengence 
against all who should dare to vote against his 
bill legalizing marriages between white men and 
squaws. Jim and his cannon were both loaded 
that morning, when he arose with blood in his 
eye, and swore he would blow out all the brains 
of the assembled lawmakers if they killed his 
bill. He declared that what Dakota needed was 
less brains and more children, and he struck 
his fist on the desk and moved that the 
Legislature adjourn and take Indian wives and 
go out populating country.
Violence was very common during the early days. 
Frontier wars and land fights among settlers and between 
settlers and territorial officials were common. In 1873, 
General E. S. McCook, Secretary of the Territory, was 
shot and killed in a public railroad meeting in Yankton 
by P. P. Wintermute, a banker. Armstrong, Centennial 
Exhibition, p. 16.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,” in Dakota 
Panorama, pp. 186-205; Loundsberry, North Dakota 
History, pp. 2M-25, 369-89.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,” in Dakota 
Panorama, pp. 93-97; Briggs, Frontiers of the 
Northwest, p. 82; Kingsbury, History  ^ 1:509-60; An Act 
to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of 
Dakota, and to Create the Office of Surveyor General 
Therein" 239-^; Loundsbury, North Dakota History-^
1:262—68; Compendium, pp. 89-92.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,” in Dakota 
Panorama, pp. 103, 186-95; Kingsbury, History, 1:786- 
9 6; Pomeroy, Territories, p. 37.
CHAPTER IV
THE STATEHOOD MOVEMENT IN EARNEST
After the turbulent early years, 1861-1870, Dakota 
settled down to developing its vast land. Under the 
territorial status established by Congress, Dakota was 
able to build a solid economy and stable government 
carefully. Pacification of the Indians assured setters 
unhindered access to the land, population boomed with the 
arrival of European immigrants, political party organiza­
tion evolved, and a decrease in federal expenditures 
resulted in a less colonial relationship with 
Washington. Now that the territory was in order,
Dakotans could afford to direct their attention toward 
petitioning Congress to admit them to the Union as an 
equal state .
It was natural that Dakotans became interested in 
bringing the territory into the Union. Citizens started 
to ask for statehood as early as 1871, when a memorial 
was initiated and adopted by the Territorial Assembly and 
relayed to Congress, asking for territorial division on 
an east-west line at the 46th parallel of north latitude 
(roughly along the current line dividing North and South
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Dakota). But no action was taken. Similar resolutions 
were adopted in Dakota territory in 1872, 187^ and 1877;
pall met with the same dismal disregard. These 
requests were repeated frequently until statehood in 
1889. Congress received petitions, memorials, and 
individual pleas from the territory regularly.
It was apparent from the early days of the territory 
that a unique situation developed in Dakota. The 
citizens did not wish to remain a single large territory 
and ultimately become a large state. They decided, at an 
early date, that their interests would be better served 
if they were two separate entities. Each time a memorial 
was submitted, they made a request for separate terri­
tories, permission to write two constitutions, establish­
ment of two state governments, and finally, the grant of 
statehood for two states with all of its privileges and
rights.^
However, Dakota's actions were futile. At this 
early date in the history of the territory, neither the 
Republicans nor the Democrats in Washington were inter­
ested in the least in a distant territory. The slightest 
notion that the territory was dissatisfied with being too 
large or the fact the residents did not particularly like 
associating with other members from distant parts of the 
territory caused Congress to dismiss the entire Dakota 
issue. Washington politicians were not interested in
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forming new territories or admitting any new states— much 
less two. There was no considerable discussion in 
Congress at this time about bringing in new states and 
any deliberations were, more than likely, negative 
towards two states. Upon hearing that Dakota wanted to 
divide and become two states, Republican Senator William 
M. Stewart of Nevada observed, "there is not sufficient 
good land in the whole of Dakota Territory to make more 
than one state. We are making too many small territories 
which could never become states. It would be better to 
consolidate rather than divide."^
This preoccupation with dual statehood therefore 
caused problems for the young territory, ultimately 
prolonging the prospect of joining the Union for many 
years. The reason stemmed from an appearance of disunity 
within the territory. Congress had a perfect opportunity 
and right to put aside the wishes of a disorganized 
territory, noting that even Dakotans were unclear about 
what they really wanted.
Division of the territory was always a vital consid­
eration to the Dakotans. They were not satisfied 
remaining a large, clumsy territory with pockets of 
settlement. All elements agreed the territory was too 
extensive, and that sheer size would prevent government 
from operating properly.^ Distance hindered travel and
57
communication between population centers, causing intense 
isolation and sectionalism.®
Considering the fact that the first colonists 
occupied the conservative, southeastern area, fanning out 
from Yankton, it is no surprise that they regarded them­
selves as the political center of the territory. They 
never fostered any affection for the north. They consid­
ered that "part of the territory north of the 46th 
parallel [to be] a barren and desolate waste and believed 
it would never support any considerable population and 
would always be a burden to the southern half if they 
were tied t o g e t h e r . T h e  southeastern section felt 
totally self-contained, practicing diversified farming on 
a small scale supplemented by a strong, well-established 
business community. Its trade centers were Chicago,
Sioux City, Milwaukee and, to a lesser degree,
Minneapolis/St. Paul.®
The second major center of population in the 
territory, the Black Hills, was located in the south­
western corner of southern Dakota. It was given slight 
consideration by the Yankton group, for it was completely 
unsettled until the gold rush of 1874. Official opening 
of the area occurred after the Indian and settler claims 
were resolved in 1877. The discovery of gold at
approximately the same time prompted thousands to flood
qinto the region with gold fever.7 Transient miners and
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minimal agriculture gave the Black Hills an uncertain 
reputation. Speculation was the key to this region. The 
Hills tended to be less organized politically than 
Yankton, thereby posing no immediate threat to Yankton's 
supremacy. Throughout the territorial period the Black 
Hills more or less followed the political lead of the 
southeastern section of Dakota. The question of division 
of the territory was between the northern half of the 
territory and the southern half; there were no other 
fragmented groups in other parts of the territory that 
were politically important.
Naturally, as the population expanded throughout the 
northern section and a budding economy emerged, southern 
Dakota came to view its backward neighbor with apprehen­
sion. It watched the growing power of the great rail­
roads and influence of eastern corporations in the 
northern half and feared domination by them.10 This 
third region, northern Dakota, possessed a predominantly 
wheat growing and grazing economy, including the famous 
Bonanza farms of the Red River Valley. Their trade 
centers were Minneapolis/St. Paul, Duluth and 
Winnipeg.11 The completion of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad to Bismarck in 1873 attracted significant 
numbers of settlers from Minnesota and Canada to northern 
Dakota. Population spread north and south along the Red 
River Valley and east and west on the right of way of the
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Northern Pacific. Northern Dakotans rather enjoyed the
benefits of the railroad and additional population. They
soon realized the potential political and commercial 
1?advantages.
Southern Dakotans, on the other hand, were not 
delighted with a growing northern economy. They 
vigorously clamored to Washington for separate terri­
tories. They felt their potential strength was 
threatened and they were unwilling to share their 
political power with the northern section of the 
territory, nor were they intending to follow economi­
cally. It is not surprising, therefore, that over the 
years, the Dakota Territory established most business, 
professional, and religious organizations with dual opera 
tions. In the early 1880's, penal, charitable, and 
educational institutions were also organized with future 
division in mind. Institutions were set up in pairs, 
including the insane asylums, north 1883, south 1879; 
penitentiaries, north 1883, south 1881; universities, 
north 1883, south 1883; agricultural colleges, north 
1883, south 1881; normal school, north 1883, south 1881. 
It seemed each half of the territory was determined to 
have as little contact as possible with the other, which 
accentuated the problem. J
In summary, there were two unique, segregated 
sections in Dakota with different economic, political,
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even social views. Neither of the section's trusted the 
other and whatever powers or influence already possessed 
were jealously guarded. Fellowship and helpfulness was 
not extended from one part of the territory to another, 
resulting in years of discord. Regionalism later proved 
to be a serious problem when the push for statehood 
needed unity and a common goal.11*
Southern Dakota's anxiety about the north was 
increased by the capital removal issue. The decision to 
transfer its location from the southern stronghold, 
Yankton, to the northern part of the territory was viewed 
with displeasure. A possible loss of the capital to the 
North obviously indicated a decline in political impor­
tance both for Yankton as well as the southern half of 
Dakota. Since this area had, up to now, dominated the 
political arena, one can readily understand the alarm. 
Early in the 1880's, Governor Nehemiah G. Ordway devel­
oped the plan to move the capital from Yankton to another 
part of the territory. He reasoned that this action 
would strengthen the territory, believing that Dakota 
could eventually be admitted into the Union as one 
powerful, large state. In 1883, he secured the removal 
of the capital from Yankton to Bismarck, claiming the 
population had shifted northward and a centrally located 
capital would be more accessable to the entire 
territory. Besides, Yankton was in an inconvenient
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location and, according to Ordway, the amenities of 
official and social life were being entirely ignored 
since it was so distant from the social hubs in the 
larger cities. Bismarck, on the other hand, hardly 
qualified as a center of social activity in 1883. This 
sentiment indicates Ordway seemed willing to attach any 
issue to the capital removal situation.
Governor Ordway believed in the bidding system.
This called for interested towns and cities to submit a 
bid if they were serious about becoming the new terri­
torial capital. In his Governor’s report of 1883 he 
stated that it was the "propriety and duty of the 
governor and legislative assembly to secure proper 
capitol buildings without cost to the Territory." J 
The bids were to be submitted to the Executive Committee 
Alexander McKenzie, Alexander Hughes, John P. Belding, 
George A. Mathews, Burleigh F. Spalding, Milo W. Scott, 
Charles H. Myers, Henry H. DeLong, and M.D. T h o m p s o n .
The bids were to include the following: amount of 
money, description of the land, twenty percent of the 
cash donated, a bond for the amount of the proposal, an 
abstract, and free title to the land. The Commission 
stated that the following bids were received: Aberdeen, 
$100,000 and 160 acres of land; Pierre, $100,000 and 250 
acres; Bismarck, $100,000 and 320 acres; Mitchell, 
$160,000 and 160 acres; Redfield, $100,000 and 240 acres
62
Ordway, $100,000 and 320 acres; Canton, $100,000 and 160 
acres; Frankfort, $100,000 and 160 acres; Huron, $100,000 
and 160 acres; Odessa, $200,000 and 160 acres; and 
Steele, $100,000 and 160 acres. It soon became obvious 
that Bismarck was the favorite choice for the capital. 
Although other cities matched or exceeded Bismarck’s bid, 
the officials who were in a position to vote on the 
issue, clearly wanted Bismarck regardless of the other 
bids. It was necessary the Committee meet in Yankton, 
the current capital, however, so Ordway conveniently 
arranged the party to be aboard a train that whisked it 
through the city, thereby fulfilling the requirements but 
omitting the unpleasant necessity of hearing serious 
objections. Eventually all the sites were visited by the 
Commission and final selection was voted on in Fargo,
June 1, 1 883* Bismarck was chosen on the 5th ballot.^
In the final analysis, the single-state advocates 
were victorious when it came to the capital removal 
bill. Ordway, confident from the support given by the 
Northern Pacific Railroad, powerful political boss 
Alexander McKenzie, and many newspapers, singlehandedly 
postponed the dual territory-statehood proposition. 
Ordway, along with his backers, represented the strongest 
political bloc in the territory. Whereas the majority of 
northern Dakotans heretofore supported dual statehood,
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they were now thrilled with their new importance and
1 ftmany, in turn, supported Ordway's one-state plan. °
There were other strong supporters of the single 
state plan. Among them were railroads and eastern 
investors who preferred the territorial system with its 
indulgent officials and legislature. Friends and 
lobbyists in Washington could also exercise effective 
influence that would be felt in the territory both in 
legislation and appointments. By supporting Ordway, they 
believed statehood would be delayed because the inhab­
itants of the territory would disagree, thereby splitting 
any organized effort to achieve statehood and neces­
sitating a continuance of the territorial s y s t e m .19 
Local Democrats also defected from the 
divisionists. President Grover Cleveland, elected in 
1884, was the first Democrat to be elected President 
since Dakota Territory was organized. New Democratic 
appointees soon found it difficult to support earlier 
ideas of division and statehood, for these moves would 
curtail their command of local affairs. In addition, 
the Democratic pary, in Washington, naturally believed 
that one state was better than two, considering the 
Republican affiliations of the inhabitants. It believed 
it could influence the Republican territorial residents
if the Democratic officials were to retain local control21for a few years.
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The removal of the capital and Ordway's single state 
plan both further alienated southern Dakota from the 
north and led to an intense campaign for immediate
Opdivision and statehood for the southern half. The 
south believed it was unjustly treated by the Ordway 
government and felt a territorial government was totally 
inadequate. In the end, it almost became an anti-Ordway 
campaign with more vigor than the dual statehood quest. 
Leaders in the southern section felt he exemplified the 
typical inadequate, corrupt territorial official. Hatred 
for Ordway brought strength to the south. Both parts of 
the territory at least agreed that transplanted officials 
did not understand the needs of the people, much less 
regional politics. Many officials capitalized on lenient 
laws and increased their own fortunes with little regard 
for the people they were serving. Political feuds 
revolved around select charismatic men who manipulated 
the government to serve their needs. ^  It is no 
surprise that appointees, often referred to as "carpet­
baggers," were targets of much criticism. One terri­
torial delegate, William Stewart of Nevada, spoke for 
many of his colleagues in Congress, when he contended the 
territories were "treated as alien land; as a sort of
Botany Bay for the rest of the United States to which to
24banish broken-down politicians and needy individuals." 
Dakotans, especially those from the southern part of the
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territory after the settlement of the capital removal
issue, felt their individual rights were not protected 
under this system of government.
Political grievances were numerous under the 
territorial system of government and received the most 
verbal criticism from the people. Yankton resident
Joseph Ward clearly expressed his opinion
To hold any part of our 
Territory, is a violation of 
principles of our growth, is 
history, and is dangerous to 
self-government 
national life, 
distinguishes us
country as a 
the fundamental 
contrary to our 
our national 
is the character- 
It is the one 
from other
life. Local 
istic of our 
feature that
nations. . . . Hence we see that the 
torial system is a dangerous part of 
national life, because it is 
to the fundamental principle 
at the same time is building 
proportions the centralizing 
already too strong. Specifically it is 
dangerous, because it takes away from large 
bodies of citizens the privilege and the duty 
of self government. Often these groups of 
citizens are more numerous than those that 
a State government. Always they are equal 
virtue and intelligence. They may in some 
cases excel in enterprise and sturdy vigor.
They are loyal to the nation, obeying all her 
laws. In times of peril they quickly respond 
to her call for help. They have borne the 
first shock of savage uprisings; they have 
patiently endured the ills that are inseparable 
from the developing of new lands. No part of 
our people exceed them in loving reverence for 
the Fathers of the Republic. None are more 
loyal to the fundamental principles of our 
national life than those who are shut out from 
a full share in our common inheritance until—  
until when?^-5
terri- 
our
a constant menace 
of our life, and 
into dangerous 
tendency that is
have
in
Dakotans wanted to gain control of the political 
structure. Foremost in their minds was the ability to
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elect their own officials, those they knew and trusted. 
Elections would presumably bring officials to office on 
the basis of merit, not through the national spoils 
system. Citizens resented the influx of alien appointees 
from Washington with incompatible views. By establishing 
normal political representation, Dakotans felt they would 
bring the government closer to its inhabitants, thereby 
promoting more responsible officials. Local representa­
tion would improve the local legislature, which would 
devote itself to state projects and bring about more 
effective utilitization of money and time. The political 
organization of the proposed state would not be burdened 
by the Washington bureaucracy which, up to now, held veto 
power on every proposition. Furthermore, members of the 
Dakota community would be able to send their own people 
to Congress as voting members and they themselves would 
have the right to vote in all national elections. Local 
elections would also improve the judiciary. An increase 
in the number and the quality of judges would contribute 
to speedier trials, more timely decisions, and hence a 
superior judicial system. °
Secondary to political oppression, financial restric­
tions were imposed by the ineffective territorial govern­
ment. Dakotans felt that independence would advance a 
stable, prosperous economy. A principal injustice was 
the subject of taxation, dictated by Washington. The
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inhabitants of the territory felt they were taxed without 
representation, considering the fact there were no voting 
members from the territory in Congress. Governor Arthur 
C. Mellette, in his address to the Territorial Assembly 
in 1885, summed up this frustration: "Citizens of 
Dakota," he said, "inherit the right of self-government 
from the Pilgrim Fathers and the Huguenot exiles. The 
blood of their ancestors in the revolution cries out 
against taxation without representation, while their own 
blood and limbs left on freedom's battlefields entitles 
them to freedom."2  ^ A system would be authorized to 
curb county and municipal indebtness; and in all likeli­
hood, salaries for elected state officials would be lower 
than for appointed territorial officers. The formation 
of a new state would also enhance the value of property 
within its boundaries, and stablize the state's 
credit.2®
One economic and political problem, school lands, 
was a major concern to Dakotans. According to the 
Organic Act, two sections (16 and 30) were set aside in 
each township for schools. Over years of territorial 
neglect, these school lands were whittled away by 
squatters, land speculators, and land companies. Not 
only was the land being sold for ridiculously low prices, 
but the territory was not receiving the revenue. In 
addition, there was a decrease in school taxes, further
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compounding the difficulties. Through the efforts of the 
vigilant General William Henry Harrison Beadle, the 
scandal was exposed. His constant crusade at every level 
of government was instrumental in saving the remaining 
lands. However, this problem remained a persistent 
concern throughout the territorial period. Dakotans 
believed only a state government would effectively end
this destructive situation.
Thus, Dakota Territory, subject to an increasingly
intolerable colonial status, felt compromised by false
promises from Washington. Considering that many Dakotans
were former residents of eastern states, they were keenly
aware of the principles of self-rule and were eager for
all Dakotans to enjoy the same privileges. They compared
themselves with the colonial dependency the United States
experienced under George III. Dakotans agreed with the
Utah Territorial Democratic delegate of the 1860's, Mr.
John F. Kinney, who compared the territories to
mere colonies, occupying much the same relation 
to the General Government as the colonies did 
to the British Government prior to the Revolu­
tion. You give them the form of government, 
but withhold from the people the right of 
elective franchise. You appoint their 
Governor, their secretary, their judges, their 
marshal, and their district attorney, and too 
often impose these officers upon them from a 
class of men who have no interest in common 
with the people, and know nothing of the trials 
and struggles of their infant settlement.
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They wanted to be free from alien rule and economic 
exploitation, to be in control of their own destiny. 
Proponents of statehood also claimed that it would bring 
not only political and economic freedom, it would 
initiate increased immigration and possibly attract money 
to the new state.
Impatience with the situation in Dakota Territory
thus grew intolerable as the years passed by. Numerous
delegations traveled to the nation's capital; they
received excellent treatment and grand promises from
Washington politicians. However, when the statehood
question came up for vote in Congress, political promises
absolutely fell through. Time and time again Dakota's
hopes for statehood were frustrated.
A perfect opportunity for passage came during the
Forty-Seventh Congress, 1882-1883. Dakotans optimisiti-
cally viewed this as the perfect opportunity because the
Republicans controlled both the House and the Senate, and
they had historically been sympathetic to the cause. The
statehood bill was once again brought before Congress,
and the results were expected to be favorable. Senators
confidently pointed to the plight of Dakota Territory.
As Republican Senator John J. Ingalls of Kansas stated,
I believe that all the objections which have 
been hitherto urged against the passage of that 
[statehood] bill are purely partisan and 
malignant. . . .  I have no doubt that if the 
population of Dakota was not well known to be
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distinctively Republican, and that its admis­
sion into the Union as a State would result in 
an accession of two Republican Senators to this 
body, that [statehood] bill would have been 
long ago acted upon.-^ '
Hopeful Dakotans were soon to be disappointed, 
however, for a previously unpublicized problem surfaced. 
Yankton County was involved with bonds issued through the 
First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine. In 1872, the 
county floated railroad bonds in the amount of $200,000 
to secure the construction of the Dakota Southern 
Railroad from Sioux City, Iowa, to Yankton. This was the 
first railroad to serve Yankton County. For several 
years, Yankton County levied a tax for payment of the 
interest on the bonds; their payment schedule was 
prompt. In 1881, however, Yankton stopped payment on the 
bonds, claiming the railroads did not keep their contract 
and the Territorial Legislature had issued the bonds 
unlawfully in the first place. Needless to say, the bank 
brought suit against Yankton, going all the way to the 
United States Supreme C o u r t . T h e  Court decided that 
Yankton was responsible for the obligation previously 
contracted. The county then appealed to the Territorial 
Assembly to assist in payment of the bonds. The end 
result of this untidy situation was that between Yankton 
County and the Territorial Assembly, there was still 
approximately $100,000 overdue in unpaid interest by the 
year 1883.33
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Needless to say, this repudiation of the bonds was 
enough to cause quite an uproar in the press and in 
Congress. Newspapers across the country reported 
Dakota's failure to pay on these bonds. The New York 
Independent reminded "the people of Dakota that public 
honesty is a cardinal qualification for both the right 
and the capability of self-government."^ Another 
negative report came from the Philadelphia Press:
"there is no hurry about Dakota anyway, and in ten years 
or more perhaps enough people who believe in paying debts 
will have settled there, to enable the Territory to come 
before Congress and the country with clean hands, and not 
as now, dark with the stain of dishonesty.35 Similar 
statements came from Congress. In 1883, Republican 
Senator Eugene Hale of Maine was so disgusted that he 
promised Dakota would not be admitted to the Union until 
it paid its debts.
The opposition to the admission of the 
Territory of Dakota, so far as I was concerned, 
had neither in it "partisanship" nor 
"malignancy." I objected because an important 
part of that Territory in its record in dealing 
with its creditors was tainted with the worst 
and most inexcusable form of repudiation. I 
objected further because that action of the 
county of Yankton, an important part of the 
Territory of Dakota, had been participated in 
and sanctioned and indorsed by the Territorial 
Legislature.^  b
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On the other hand, Preston B. Plumb, Republican Senator 
from Kansas, had a slightly different point of view of 
repudiation.
The town of Elizabeth, in New Jersey, and 
the town of Rahway, in the same State— I 
mention these because they are conveniently 
near; I do not need to go west of the 
Mississippi River for illustration— had 
defaulted in their interest and in their 
creditors during a long period of years. . . .
[it] was a great deal less than the people west 
of the Mississippi River [Dakota] voluntarily 
and cheerfully take upon themselves not only 
for purpose of discharging their current obliga­
tions but for the purpose of paying their 
debts. . . .  I want to take the towns in New 
Jersey and in Maine and all over the country, 
and ascertain just exactly how much the 
practice of repudiation proves the unfitness of 
a people for republican government. There 
should be no reflection upon Dakota until the 
communities now in the Union are thoroughly 
purged.3'
The Yankton bond issue helped defeat Dakota's bid 
for statehood in 1883. Although Dakota had the support 
of the Republican Party, statehood was not achieved 
because of problems caused by the territory itself. Both
the House and the Senate were reluctant to bring in 
Dakota, after the territory was tainted with 
repudiation. Reports were also submitted to Congress 
outlining the economic problems of the period, which were 
compounded by the fact that the railroads were not 
complete across the territory.
At the same time, Dakota Governor Nehemiah Ordway 
vetoed the necessary constitutional convention. He again
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demonstrated the strength of his political machine, which 
was backed by the powerful railroads and newspapers. He 
did not want statehood because he was satisfied with 
keeping things the way they were, under his control. 
Ordway dominated the single-state issue during his term 
as governor (1880-1884). After his appointment ended, he 
moved to Washington where he coninued to support 
Democratic policies. When he left the territory, the 
single-state advocates were left without their most vocal 
leader; however, they were still strong enough to keep 
the agitation active until statehood in 1889. Between 
the Yankton bondholders and Governor Ordway's veto,
Dakota was unable to gain statehood during the meeting of 
the Republican dominated Senate and House. What appeared 
to be the most opportune moment, turned to failure. The 
result was predictable, and the second sesssion of
O OCongress ended without a vote on statehood.-50
Led by Hugh C. Campbell and Joseph Ward, many 
territorial residents now felt they had a right to 
establish a state, with or without congressional 
approval. Their strongest argument, expressed in 1883 
and continued until 1889, stemmed from their belief that 
at least southern Dakotans felt like citizens of the 
United States. Philosophically, the people were "already 
a state;" therefore, it was a mere formality for Congress 
to make it legal. They extended their arguments to point
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out historical precedents, for twelve states had hereto­
fore been admitted to the Union without an enabling act 
or Washington endorsement.^9 Dakota inhabitants felt 
they were entitled to statehood by fulfilling the require­
ments of population and size, and according to the 
following qualifications, which they believed had been 
met:
1. Ordinance of 1787, Article V. :
Whenever any of the said states shall have 
60,000 free inhabitants therein, such State 
shall be admitted by its delegates into the 
Congress of the United States, on an equal 
footing with the original States, in all 
respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to 
form a permanent Constitution and State 
government.
2. Treaty with France regarding the 
Louisiana Purchase, 1803: the inhabitants of 
the ceded territory shall be incorporated in 
the Union of the United States and admitted as 
soon as possible . . . .  to the enjoyments of 
all the rights, advantages and immunities of 
citizens of the United States. '
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford: There is 
certainly no power given by the Constitution to 
the Federal Government to establish or maintain 
colonies bordering on the United States or at a 
distance, to be ruled and governed at its own 
pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits 
in any way, except by the admission of new 
States. . . .  no power is given to acquire a 
Territory to be held and governed permanently 
in that character. . . . but to be admitted as 
soon as its population and situation would 
entitle it to admission. It is acquired to 
become a State, and not to be held as a colony 
and governed by Congress with absolute 
authority; and as the propriety of admitting a 
new State is committed to the sound discretion 
of Congress, the power to acquire territory for 
that purpose to be held by the United States 
until it is in a suitable condition to become a
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State upon equal footing with the older States,
must rest upon the same discretion. ^
Despite Governor Ordway, the Territory of Dakota was 
extremely anxious to enter the Union as two manageable 
states, not one large cumbersome state. (Earlier 
discussion pinpointed the numerous reasons the two 
sections of the territory wanted independence from each 
other.) Thus, citizens were finally provoked, after 
years of rejection, to take matters into their own 
hands. The southern part of the territory organized an 
association under the title of the Dakota Citizens' 
League; two conventions were called, in 1883 and 1885.
The 1883 results included, for southern Dakota, a consti­
tution, capital in Yankton, restriction on the sale of 
school lands, organization of a state government, 
adoption of a prohibition platform, election of members 
to Congress (Alonzo J. Edgerton and Colonel Gideon J. 
Moody) and nomination of a host of state officials 
(Arthur C. Melette, governor). Under the League's plan 
northern Dakota would be reorganized into the Territory 
of Lincoln. Submitted to the residents of the entire 
Dakota Territory, the respective proposals were over­
whelmingly approved, by a vote of 12,336 for and 6,814 
against. Critics of the plan claimed there was an 
extremely light vote, since 30,000 settlers did not 
bother to go to the polls.
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Many apathetic nonvoters saw the referendum as a 
futile gesture, since it was taken without legal authori­
zation. The Republican Senate approved the plan, but 
after the Democratic House ignored it, southern Dakota 
tried again in 1885 with a revision of the 1883 plan.
The only outstanding new feature included a clause 
(Section 32) promoted by moderates Alonzo J. Edgerton and 
Colonel Gideon C. Moody, denying any unauthorized persons 
or assemblage from launching a new government without 
Congressional approval:
Nothing in this Constitution or Schedule 
contained shall be construed to authorize the 
legislature to exercise any powers except such 
as are necessary to its organization, to elect 
U.S. Senators, to provide and pass means and 
measures necessary, preliminary and incident to 
admission to the Union, and to assemble and 
reassemble, and adjourn from time to time; 
neither to authorize any officer of the execu­
tive or administrative departments to exercise 
any powers of his office except such as may be 
preliminary and incident to admission to the 
Union; nor to authorize any officer of the 
judiciary department to exercise any of the 
duties of of his office until the State of 
Dakota shall have been regularly admitted into 
the Union, except such as may be authorized by 
the Congress of the United States. 4
This proviso was intended to placate Congress and remove
a radical taint from the action of the Dakota Citizens'
League. The 1885 program was approved by the territorial
inhabitants on a vote of 25,138 pro and 6,527 con.^
In compliance with the technical qualifications, the
territory claimed in its own behalf an appropriate size,
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the proper size, adequate resources to sustain itself, 
stable educational and religious organizations, numerous 
newspapers, and sturdy, outstanding citizens with full 
understanding of the virtues of statehood. According to 
the 1885 Journal of the House of the territorial 
assembly,
Dakota has a population of 500,000; larger 
than two Colorados, five Delawares, three 
Floridas, twelve Nevadas, two New Hampshires, 
three Oregons, two Rhode Islands or two 
Vermonts. It has a territory of 150,932 square 
miles, equal to the combined area of Maine,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Ohio 
and West Virginia, less 1,954 square 
miles. . . Dakota pays more Internal Revenue 
than four states; Delaware, Florida, Nevada,
Vermont; . . . more post office revenue than 
thirteen states; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Delaware, West Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Oregon, Nevada, District of Columbia;
[and] . . . has more banks and bank capital 
than five states. Therefore, it is demon­
strated beyond contradiction that we have the 
territory, the population. ,and the resources to 
entitle us to two states. D
The Republican Senate approved the statehood plan 
but the Democratic House, pretending to be appalled by 
such revolutionary action, rejected the southern Dakota 
constitution. Those Democrats added that the small vote 
in the territory certainly did not represent the feelings 
of the entire population.^  in the long run, Dakota's 
actions were fruitless. The territory was denied 
statehood and even reprimanded for insolence. The 
constitutional conventions of 1883 and 1885, although
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approved by the Dakota Legislature, failed to receive the
4 ftrecognition necessary to secure statehood. u
Dakotans, ever impatient, decided to try to direct 
their future themselves. They started to consider the 
possibility of taking Section 32 out of the document, 
which presumbaly would allow them to establish a state 
government without Congressional approval. Territorial 
reactions were mixed; many did not want to remove Section 
32 as this would only aggravate Congress.
Needless to say, the doubters were correct. When 
congressmen got wind of this plan, they thought Dakota 
was acting senselessly. Benjamin Harrison, who had 
introduced the original Senate bill, was unhappy with the 
possibility of changing the constitution because it would 
force the already approved bill to be re-submitted again 
for approval in the Senate. He wrote Moody, who had been 
"elected" to Congress under the 1883 constitution, "I do 
not need to say to you, for you know my views fully, that 
an attempt to set up a state government in opposition to 
your present Territorial government would be illegal and 
ill advised. I could not defend that course in the 
Senate. I believe it would alienate many of your 
friends, and I would not be surprised if it ended forever 
the proposition for the dis-union of Dakota."1^
Harrison also presented this question to Hugh J.
Campbell, one of the leaders of the illegal movement. "I
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believe it would be a grave mistake to resoind Section 32 
of your Ordinance, as far as it relates to Congressional 
action. Would it not require a re-submission of the 
Constitution, as amended, to Congress and a new bill for 
admission under your Constitution as amended? If your 
people shall modify the Constitution, which is referred 
to and accepted in the bill which has passed the Senate, 
that legislation it seems to me would fail".^0 Three 
days later he again wrote to Moody, "it seems to me it 
puts us in an attitude of insincerity. We defended the 
action of your people in the Senate last winter, chiefly 
upon the provisions of Section 32, and insisted that they 
did not intend to set up any state government until 
Congress gave its consent. To repeal that section now 
looks like insincerity and, besides, it seems to me that 
if the Convention modifies the Constitution which has 
been submitted to Congress, and which the Senate has 
accepted, the whole matter would have to be begun anew. 
The instrument would be different.”^  Dakota was duly 
reprimanded and the issue gradually diminished over the 
next few years.
By now, 1886, Dakotans were discouraged and apathy 
replaced the once vigorous desire to become a state.
Even former strong divisionists were giving up on their 
goal to make Dakota Territory into two separate states. 
The Grand Forks Plaindealer lamented to its readers that
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"the longer the territory remains undivided, the less 
opposition there will be found to admission as a 
w h o l e . O n e  memorial, of uncertain origin, 
complained that "we are tired of living in a political 
graveyard. We are tired of walking among political 
skeletons. We long for newer fields and greener pastures 
upon the same ground but would have no 'divisions of the 
farm'."^3
The reason for the decline in activity in the push 
for statehood was not totally due to political discour­
agement. Granted, Dakotans were tired of submitting 
unheeded memorials, and up to this point it made little 
difference whether they advocated one or two states. 
However, more personal, financial problems occupied the 
average Dakotan. The economy was in decline in the late 
1880's. The great depression of 1886 crippled the 
economy nationally, causing a marked loss of investment 
capital and a loss of confidence in business. Each of 
these factors affected Dakota Territory, still dependent 
on eastern investors and markets. In addition, Dakota 
experienced crop failures from 1886 to 1889 because of 
severe drought. This situation was coupled with a 
decline in the extensive railroad programs in the terri­
tory; projected branch lines used to promote settlement 
were simply not built because a lack of sufficient 
investment capital and depressed markets. This factor
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1Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls,." in Dakota 
Panorama, p. 189.
2U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Territories, 
View of the Minority, Admission of Dakota, 49th Cong.,
1st sess., 1886, H. Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442), pp. 8-9- 
R. M. Black, "History of the State Constitutional Conven­
tion of 1889," Collections of the State Historical 
Society of North Dakota 3 (1910):111-23. Black offers a 
chronological account of all the memorials, petitions and 
resolutions that passed through the Congress between 1871 
and 1889. Everett W. Sterling, "The Bumpy Road to 
Statehood," in Dakota Panorama, p. 363, hereinafter 
referred to as "Bumpy Road" in Dakota Panorama, points 
out that a longitutional division along the 100th 
meridian was proposed. Altering the boundary to run 
along the Missouri River was also considered. Various 
names suggested for the northern part of the territory 
were Pembina, Algonquin, and Lincoln. Southern Dakota 
selfishly claimed the name Dakota. Lamar, Dakota 
Territory, pp. 368-69; Kingsbury, History, 2:1612; 
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:321; Loundsberry, 
North Dakota History^ 1:368-69.
^Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:366;
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:321. Along with 
the petitions, a variety of names for northern Dakota 
were suggested. Pembina, an all-time favorite, was 
offered in 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, and 1879. U.S.,
Congress, House, Congressional Record, 43rd Cong., 1st 
sess., 1874, 2, pt-! 5:4331 -32; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Congressional Record, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 1880, 11,
pt.1:11—12, 34; Cong. Record, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 
pt. 2:1199. Northern or North Dakota received the most 
attention and approval. It was petitioned in 1880. The 
northern half did not wish to relinquish the name of 
Dakota. U.S., Congress, House, Journal, 46 Cong., 2nd 
sess., March 18, 1880, p. 804.
^Cong. Record, 43rd Cong., 1 sess., pt. 5:4331 - 
32. There was an interesting discussion by Representa­
tive Stewart about the question of female suffrage. The 
bill concerning the establishment of the Territory of 
Pembina (northern Dakota) allowed women to participate in 
politics. Mr. Stewart is quoted:
The question of female suffrage is a 
question that is being seriously considered by 
a large portion of the people of the United 
States. . . . Here is a new Territory to be 
created and it is a good opportunity to try
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this experiment. If it works badly, when the 
Territory becomes a State there is nobody 
committed. . . .  If it works well, it may 
spread elsewhere. It certainly can do no harm 
in that country. There are very few people 
there. . . . There is certainly no pressing 
necessity for the establishment of this 
Territory. I doubt the propriety of it very 
seriously. As I said before, we are making too 
many Territories. We are dividing this country 
up into small subdivisions that never can 
become States. But if we are to make this 
Territory, it affords us an opportunity to try 
a fair experiment on the subject of female 
suffrage. This Territory is up in the far 
North where people have to work pretty hard to 
live. It will be inhabited by a frugal and 
industrious people necessarily, if it be 
inhabited at all, and let this experiment there 
be tried.
^Kingsbury, History, 2:1412-13; Hunkins, South 
Dakota , pp . 115 — 1 "5TI
^Sterling, ’Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama, p.
363. Traditionally traffic crossed the territory in an 
east-west mode. Railroads, major roads, trade routes, 
even the telegraph followed the common trails. Even 
after the railroads had advanced to the Missouri, north- 
south travel was so inferior that persons commonly had to 
go from northern Dakota to southern Dakota by way of St. 
Paul, Minnesota. It is interesting to note that travel 
has changed very little since the territorial period. 
Railroads and most roads still do not run north-south. 
There are only a few exceptions. Lamar, Dakota 
Territory, p. 190.
"^Burleigh F. Spalding, "Constitutional Convention, 
1889," North Dakota History 31 (July 1954):151. This 
article was originally written late in the nineteenth 
century. Spalding witnessed the events leading up to 
statehood. However, North Dakota History gives no indica­
tion as to exactly when the article was written nor where 
it was found.
®Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 504- 
508; Kingsbury, History, 2:1600. A powerful group of 
men, commonly known in the territory as the Yankton 
Oligarchy, were established in Yankton, southeastern 
portion of southern Dakota Territory. They dominated 
politics throughout the territorial period, declining
#
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after the capital was moved from Yankton to Bismarck in 
1883. They favored dual statehood for the ' territory 
during the entire territorial period. The most prominent 
were: General D. M. Frost; J. B. S. Todd; Governor Newton 
Edmunds (territorial governor, banker, land speculator); 
Judge Gideon C. Moody (lawyer, Associate Judge of Dakota 
Supreme Court, United States Senator); Governor A. J. 
Faulk (territorial governor, businessman, clerk of the 
United States District Court at Yankton, United States 
Court Commissioner); Judge W. W. Brookings (lawyer, land 
speculator, Associate Judge of Dakota Supreme Court, 
representative of railroad interests); George H. Hand 
(United States District Attorney for Dakota, lawyer, 
territorial secretary); General W. H. H. Beadle (Dakota 
School Superintendent, territorial surveyor general); 
Reverend Joseph Ward (founder of Yankton College, leader 
of the Dakota Congregational Church); Moses K. Armstrong 
(editor Yankton Dakota Herald, congressional delegate); 
Judge Jefferson P~. Kidder (lawyer, Associate Justice of 
the Dakota Supreme Court, congressional delegate, 
railroad speculator); Enos Stutsman (land speculator); 
Judge Bartlett Tripp (lawyer, land and railroad 
speculator, Chief Justice of the Dakota Supreme Court);
W. S. Bowen (editor, Yankton Press and Dakotan); George 
W. Kingsbury (publisher of the Press and Dakotan);
Judge Alonzo J. Edgerton (lawyer^ United States Senator, 
Chief Justice of the Dakota Supreme Court, railroad 
interests); Doctor W. A. Burleigh (congressional 
delegate, Indian agent); and Hugh J. Campbell (United 
States District Attorney, lawyer). Kingsbury, History, 
1:598-660; History, 2:1020-1476, 1760-95; Robinson, 
History of North Dakota, pp. 197-216; Schell, "Politics- 
Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp. 186-205; 
Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 200-315;
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:211-13; Lamar,
Dakota Territory, pp. 247-^8; John Davis Unruh, "South 
Dakota in 1889" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 
June 1939), pp. 191-92; Armstrong, Early Empire 
Builders, pp. 53-54.
^Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:319-
10Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 190-93; Robinson, 
History of North Dakota, pp~ T90-98. Since the rail- 
roads owned 24 percent of the area of the northern 
territory, their influence could not be ignored. Robert 
S. Henry, "The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American 
History Texts," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 32 
(September 1945):194.
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^Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 504- 
506; Hiram Drache, The Day of the Bonanza: A History of 
Bonanza Farming in the Red River Valley of the North 
(Fargo: North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies,
1964).
12Paxson, "Omnibus States," p. 83; Kingsbury,
History, 2:1598.
1^U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
50th Cong., 1st sess., 19, 3:3000. "Division Points,"
Grand Forks Herald, 9 August 1887, p. 2, col. 3. In 
addition to the above institutions, enjoyment was also 
segregated by two annual territorial fairs. U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Territories, Admission of 
Dakota, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1888, S. Rept. 75 
(serial 2519), pp. 1-3. John Davis Unruh, "South Dakota 
in 1889," p. 179. Payment of bonds, used to raise the 
money to build the institutions, was deemed the 
obligation of the respective section where the institu­
tion was located. Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota 
Panorama, pp. 365-67; Loundsberry, North Dakota 
History, 1:366; Green "Struggle of South Dakota," p. *1
5077!
^Green, "Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 504-506; 
Kingsbury, History, 1:846-48; History, 2:1598-1600; 
Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 109-221; Schell, 
"Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp. 
186-205; Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama, 
pp• 363-64; Compendium, pp. 88-92; Briggs, Frontiers of 
the Northwest, pp. 361-63; Lamar, Dakota Territory, 
pp. viii, ix, 170-72, 190-92; Paxson, "Omnibus States," 
p. 83; Unruh, "South Dakota in 1889," pp. 178-79.
15u.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary 
of the Interior, Report of the Governor of Dakota, 48th 
Cong., 1st sess. , 1 883, FT Ex"! Doc. 1 (serial 2191), pp. 
526-39; Ordway attempted to vindicate himself and his 
Captiol Committee on the extremely negative press he 
received during the capital removal issue.
l6Ibid., p. 527.
^Schell, Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota 
Panorama, pp. 193-94; History of the Red River 
Valley, p. 454; Federal Writers' Project of the Works 
Progress Administration for the State of North Dakota, 
North Dakota: A Guide To The Northern Prairie State (New 
York: Oxford University Press, American Guide Series,
1950), p. 52; Daily Argus, April 5, 1883. An
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excellent example of a public notice on the Capital can 
be found in the Daily Argus, April 11, 1883. These 
articles were found in the Dakota Territorial Papers,
Roll 70; see also within the same source, Supplement; 
Dakota Affairs, An Address from the Executive of Dakota 
in Defense of His Administration, March 30, 1 8 83 > Roll 
83. The Report of the Board of Capitol Commissioners to 
the Governor and Legislative Assembly, of the Territory 
of Dakota; January 24, 1885 (Bismarck, Dakota: Tribune, 
Printers and Binders, 1885), contains details of all bids 
and considerations in the capital issue.
After the bids were submitted and Bismarck was 
accepted as the new capital, the Commission authorized 
of 994 platted lots, anticipating $250,000. 
only 245 lots sold, generating only $38,849 in 
In constructing the capitol building, expenses 
to $138,849. The $38,849 in lot sales plus the 
$100,000 from Bismarck citizens paid the bills;
the sale 
However, 
revenue, 
amounted 
initial
however, 
problems
the whole capital removal issue caused financial 
for many years.
^®Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:366-75; 
Robinson, History of North Dakota, p. 201; Kingsbury, 
History of Dakota, 2:1475; Lamar, Dakota Territory, 
pp. 202-41; Paxson, "Omnibus States," p. 83; Schell, 
"Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, pp. 
193-94, 211; Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 
513-14. Ordway also wanted a seat in the U.S. Senate and 
he believed his chances were excellent, provided the 
territory entered the Union as one state. It was also 
rumored that Ordway received $30,000 from the Northern 
Pacific Railway for assisting in the capital removal. A 
close friend of Ordway, Alexander McKenzie, was one of 
the most visible Northern Pacific political agents in the 
territory. A frequent traveler between Bismarck and 
Minneapolis/St. Paul (Northern Pacific headquarters), 
McKenzie carried on most of the negotiations pertaining 
to the capital issue. Often called the "Boss of North 
Dakota," he was a natural leader.
1 Q^Robinson, History of North Dakota, p. 202. 
Eastern investors had invested millions in Dakota and 
they were unwilling to have their debtors control the 
loans. The railways enjoyed the flexible territorial 
railroad laws which could be controlled in Washington. 
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 208-209, 250-51.
20Kingsbury 
Sterling, "Bumpy
History of North Dakota, 1:413-15; 
Road," in Dakota Panorama, p. 368.
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Robinson, History of North Dakota, p. 202;
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 208-9; Paxson, "Omnibus 
States," pp. 83-84.
2 2Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:368-71.
^Schell, "Politics-Palaver and Polls" in Dakota 
Panorama, p. 188-89.
p ji Cong. Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., pt.
7:6459. Hatred of the territorial officials was under­
standable for these restless people. However, Pomeroy, 
Territories, pp. 107-8, presents a clear picture of the 
officials, pointing out that although there were some 
corrupt individuals, most appointees were dedicated 
persons who faced many obstacles. A harsh climate, 
inhospitable neighbors, a critical legislature, and poor 
payment for service were realistic barriers. Pomeroy 
believed that territorial governments would have faced 
even more severe problems without the assistance of these 
officials.
“^Joseph Ward, "The Territorial System of the 
United States," Andover Review: A Religious and 
Theological Monthly, TO (1 8 8 8): 51 , 55~.
2 ^Ibid., pp. 52-53; Green, "Struggle of South 
Dakota," pp. 520-521; Schell, "Politics— Palaver and 
Polls," in Dakota Panorama, p. 194; Loundsberry, North 
Dakota History, 1:365. Inhabitants of the territory 
viewed the national political arena with more enthusiasm 
than local politics. Colonial dependence made Dakotans 
acutely aware that national issues and individuals 
directly affected the territory. A we3k voice and no 
voting power frustrated territorial settlers, who 
desperately wanted to be on the same footing with other 
states. Pomeroy, Territories, pp. 99-100; Robinson, 
History of North Dakota, pp. 199-201.
2 ^Kingsbury, History, 2:1757.
P R°Further discussion of the economic and political 
problems are found in Ward, "Territorial Systems," pp. 52- 
3; and Goodspeed, The Province and the States, 6:314- 
19. See also Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 237-41; 
Kingsbury, History, 2:1596, 1656-57.
^Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama , 
pp. 363-66; Green, "Struggle of South Dakota," p. 508; 
Unruh, "South Dakota in 1889," pp. 200-1; Schell, 
"Politics-Palaver and Polls," in Dakota Panorama, p.
P 1
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188. The territorial superintendent of public instruc­
tion, Gereral William Henry Harrison Beadle, thought 
school land should be sold for no less than ten dollars 
per acre. The proper authorities, Congress and the 
Territorial Assembly, were negligent in their protection 
of school lands. More could have been done if these 
bodies would have taken a firm stand. According to the 
Organic Act, two sections in each township were set aside 
for future schools. Laws of Dakota , 1862, pp. 21-28.
See also General William Henry Harrison Beadle to Alvin 
Sanders, U.S. Senate, January 18, 1882, Papers Relating 
to Dakota Territory, Manuscript Division, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.
^Delegate John F. Kenney of Utah, Cong. Globe,
38th Cong., 1st sess., 2:1171.
31 U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
47th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 883, 147 Pt"* 1:870.
^First Na tional Bank of Brunswick v. Yankton 
County, 11 Otto, (U.S.) 129 (1882).
33u.S., Congress, Senate, Protest of Bondholders 
of Yankton County, Dakota, Against The Admission of said 
Territory as a Stated 47th Cong., 1st sess., 1 882, S7 
Mis". Doc. 613 (1 993 ), pp. 1-8.
3**New York Independent, 6 April 1 882, p. 2.
•^Philadelphia Press, 21 March 1882, p. 1.
3^Cong. Record, 47th Cong., 2nd sess., pt.
1 : 8 7 0 .
37u.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
47th Cong., 1st sess., 1882, 137 Pt7 3:2277-78.
3®Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 213-14; 
Paxson, "Omnibus States," p. 827 90; Unruh, "South Dakota 
in 1888," p. 188-89; Green, "Struggle of South Dakota," 
pp. 510-12; Cong. Record, 47th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 
2:2045. For more on the Yankton bonds, see Samuel Ware 
Packard, Dakota, Statement of Facts in Support of the 
Protest Made by the Yankton County Bondholders Against 
the Admission of Dakota (n.p., 1888), pp. 1-32; A Protest
Against the Admission of Dakota as A State; Signed the 
First National Bank of Brunswick, Maine; A. H. Merryman 
and 20 Other Bondholders (n.p., 18 8 2), pp. 1-15; Opinions
of the Press. As to the Propriety of Congress Admitting 
Dakota at the Present Time (n.p., 1882), pp.1-22.
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Opinions of the Press contained choice articles from 
major newspapers across the country. Just the titles of 
the articles give adequate reflection of the public 
opinion of the issue: "Most Remarkable Exhibition of 
Financial Juggling on Record," Buffalo Express 
(Republican), April 1, 1882; "The Repudiation of These 
Bonds Is An Act of Flagrant Dishonesty Which Congress 
Should Openly Condemn By Refusing To Admit The Territory 
As State Until The Last Cent Of Debt Is Paid," 
Indianapolis Times (Republican), April 3, 1882; "Let
Dakota Wait For A Century If Need Be Until Its People Are 
Ready To Pay their Debts," New York Tribune, March 23, 
1882; "The Dakota Conspiracy--Party Lines," New York 
Herald, March 24, 1882; "It Seems As Though The
Repudiation Chickens Were Coming Home To Roost," Chicago 
Inter-Ocean (Republican), March 22, 1882; "There Is No
Valid Reason For Making This Territory Into A State 
Anyway; But If She Must Come In, Let It Be With Clean 
Hands," New York Sun, March 21, 1882.
•^The twelve states were: Vermont, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Wisconsin, 
California, Kansas, Oregon, and Nevada. Campbell 
contended that the power to frame a constitution and 
state government was sanctioned by the Ordinance of 
1787. The government could be operating before the state 
was admitted to the Union. Cong. Record, 50th Cong.,
1st sess., pt. 3:2999; Kingsbury, History, 2:1657,
1765; Robert F. Karolevitz, Challenge: The South Dakota 
Story (Sioux Falls: Brevet Press, Inc., 1975), herein­
after referred to as Challenge, pp. 171-75; Unruh,
"South Dakota in 1 889,” pp. 1^0 — 91; Green, "Struggle of 
South Dakota," pp. 521-22; Memorial to Dakota Legislature 
1885, pp. 4, 7-8; P. C. Shannon, The State of Dakota:
How It May Be Formed; Replies to the Pamphlet of Hon.
Hugh J. Campbell, U.S. Attorney of Dakota, Treating Upon 
the Above Subject (Yankton, D.T.: Herald PrintingHouse, 
1883), hereinafter referred to as The State of Dakota, 
pp. 4-5. Campbell tended to be the most radical of the 
territorial statehood advocates. He consistantly 
demanded that the territory had a right to be brought 
into the Union; he was impatient with the drawn-out 
political process. Goodspeed, The Province and the 
States, 6:314-19.
^ An Act Establishing the Territorial Government 
of Wisconsin, 31-50. Ward, "Territorial System of the 
United States," pp. 59-61; Armstrong, Early Empire 
Builders, pp. 31-50.
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^Ward, "Territorial System of the United States," 
pp. 59-61; Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts 
of the United States of America, vol. 2, "Treaty for 
the Cession of Louisiana," No. 86, 30 April 1803, PP* 498- 
511.
^Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard (U.S.), 445-51 
(1 857).
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
48th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 884, 1 6"j pt. 1: 1 07-111 ;
Admission of Dakota, H. Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442), pp. 1- 
(Ti Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 213-19;
Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 197-212;
Karolevitz, Challenge, pp. 171-75; Hunkins, South 
Dakota, p. 117; Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 234-57; 
Crawford, History of North Dakota, 1:321; Compen­
dium , p . 9^T!
^Cong., Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., pt.
3:2999.
^u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Territories, Admission of Dakota, 49th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1 886, ST Rpt. V5 (serial 2355), pp. 22-68; U.S., 
Congress, House, Committee on Territories, Minority 
Report, Admission of Dakota, 49th Cong., 1st sess.,
1886, H. Rpt. 2577 (serial 2442), pp. 4-9; Journal of the 
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention Held Under 
An Act of the Legislature at Sioux Falls, Dakota, 
September, 1S85. A. J. Edgerton, President, John Cain, 
Secretary (Sioux Falls, Dakota: sT T\ Clover, Sioux 
Falls Leader, 1885); Karolevitz, Challenge, pp. 173-75; 
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 252, 368—69T Compendium, 
p. 95.
^Green, "The Struggle of South Dakota," pp. 508- 
21; Sterling, "Bumpy Road," in Dakota Panorama, p. 363; 
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 194—99; Chicago Tribune, 
October 1, 1885, p~I 9~. Cong. Record^ 48th Cong. , 2nd
sess., pt. 1:107—111 and Journal of the House, 16th 
sess., Legislative Assembly, Dakota, 1885, pp. 125-37, 
both contain detailed reports on the good conditions of 
Dakota Territory. Also see the complete selection by 
Shannon, The State of Dakota.
^Schell, History of South Dakota, pp. 213-19; 
Robinson, History of North Dakota, pp. 197-202.
Opposition to the 1883 and 1885 documents was strong, 
including from the governor, Ordway; railroad boss, 
McKenzie; powerful eastern and territorial newspapers;
I
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and of course the Democrats, locally and nationally. In 
addition, failure to get the constitution accepted 
indicated a decline in the power of the Yankton 
Oligarchy. Recent immigrants were less politically 
minded and were not inclined to support radical programs 
to be admitted to the Union. The Citizen's League was 
still confined to selected individuals and had not 
identified itself with the settlers in the territory. 
Lamar, Dakota Territory, pp. 234-36; Sterling, "Bumpy 
Road," in Dakota Panorama, p. 363; Shannon, The State 
of Dakota, pp . 3-68.
^Report of the Governor of Dakota, pp. 523- 
26; U.S~ Congress, House, Committee on Territories, 
Admission of Dakota, Minority Report, 50th Cong., 1st 
sess. , 1 888, Rpt. 709 (serial 2600), p. 85.
^Benjamin Harrison to G. M. Moody, May 15, 1886, 
Benjamin Harrison Papers (microfilm), Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D. C., Roll 7. 
Hereinafter cited as Harrison Papers.
5°Benjamin Harrison to Hugh J. Campbell, June 5, 
1886, Harrison Papers, Roll 7.
^Benjamin Harrison to G. C. Moody, June 8, 1886,
Harrison Papers, Roll 7. Many individuals in the terri­
tory were uneasy about the steps taken to set up the 
state government without first receiving permission from 
Congress. Benjamin Harrison wrote to several leaders in 
the territory about the problem. Also in the Harrison 
papers, see Benjamin Harrison to John A. Owen, May 27, 
1886, Roll 49; Benjamin Harrison to A. C. Mellette, May 
27, 1886, Roll 49; Benjamin Harrison to V. V. Barnes,
June 5, 1886, Roll 49; and Benjamin Harrison to A. C. 
Mellette, December 6, 1886, Roll 50.
^ Grand Forks Plaindealer, 11 March 1886, p.
4; also see 15 July 1 886, p^  and 10 August 1 887, 
p. 4. Another northern newspaper, the Grand Forks 
Herald, was very clear in its feelings about the 
possibility of remaining one large state. It listed the 
numerous dual institutions and associations from doctors 
and lawyers to the fireman's organization. The article 
indicated there was nothing common in the territory 
except "an inadequate and inefficient government organiza 
tion." Grand Forks Herald, 9 August 1887, p. 2.
-^Memorial, State of Dakota , 1885. I have no 
information about this document, who wrote it or where it
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came from. I found it in the New York Public Library in 
a group of pamphlets.
54Briggs, Frontiers of the Northwest, p. 428.
CHAPTER V
SUCCESS AND STATEHOOD
In the raid-1 880’s, Dakotans faced a seemingly 
hopeless situation. Congress had steadfastly ignored 
their pleas for statehood; and although Dakotans looked 
to the Republican Party for support and leadership, a 
single champion of the cause had yet to emerge. Finally 
Benjamin Harrison, senior senator from Indiana and 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, filled 
the role of Dakota’s most active and influential backer 
for division and statehood. It was because of his 
interest that a bill admitting southern Dakota into the 
Union finally passed the Senate in 1886.1 His devotion 
to southern Dakota is readily apparent in his speeches 
and his letters to the territory. He did not necessarily 
reject northern Dakota as much as he simply ignored that 
section of the territory. However, his fiery speeches 
underlined the unfair delay of statehood for 300,000 
deserving people. He contended they had the proper 
resources and population sufficient to support both a 
state and congressmen in Washington. He eloquently 
defended the position of dual statehood:
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division 
they put 
there is 
movement 
Edmunds]
I repeat that when Senators spend their 
time in arguing such propositions and then 
offer amendments that are not calculated to 
test the popular support of this constitution 
or to test the popular opinion in Dakota as to 
division, but assuming those questions them­
selves, the one dividing the Territory upon the 
Missouri River and the other denying the
altogether, they are not sincere when 
their opposition upon the ground that 
not a popular acquiescence in this 
The Senator from Vermont [Mr. 
asks me if there have been any 
memorials remonstrating against the division. 
Not a popular convention, not a meeting of 
agriculturists, not a religious association of 
any kind, no body of men met together in North 
or in South Dakota have ever protested against 
this division. On the other hand, before it 
could be a question of politics, before any man 
could know what the politics of the States to 
be formed out of that Territory could be, her 
people settled upon the idea of division, and 
by memorials from their Legislature to 
Congress, by legislative enactments which 
assumed it for eleven years, have poured in 
upon Congress one uninterrupted and uniform 
expression in favor of division.
Harrison's efforts were frustrated in the Democratic 
controlled House of Representatives under the leadership 
of Democrat William M. Springer of Illinois, member of 
the House Committee on the Territories and Chairman of
the House Committee of the Whole. Springer did not 
particularly want to bring in any new states at that 
time, much less two with Republican tendencies.
Realizing, however, that the prospective new states could 
not be kept out indefinitely, he devised and introduced
on December 13, 1886, the Omnibus Bill, "a bill (H.R.
10225) to enable the people of Dakota, Montana,
95
Washington, and New Mexico to form constitutions and 
State governments, and to be admitted into the Union on a 
legal footing with other States. . . ."  ^ Springer's 
Omnibus bill proposed to admit four states, undivided 
Dakota, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico. Dakota and 
Montana were expected to Republican, while Washington and 
New Mexico were expected to be Democrat.1* This would 
mean each party got two states, and party advantage would 
remain unchanged, if Dakota remained undivided.^
Representative Springer, who up to now was against 
any new states, therefore introduced the bill to admit 
Dakota as one state. He realized that he had no alter­
native but to follow the change in the political climate 
and within the Democratic Party. The public was better 
informed about the western territories and was much more 
verbal about keeping deserving citizens out of the 
Union. It is no surprise that Washington politicans, 
keenly aware of this development of public opinion, were 
not interested in making the territorial situation an 
issue in the next election. Springer was more or less 
following the new Democratic policy, to bring in new 
states as soon as they fulfilled the proper requirements; 
privately, however, the party supported the the program 
which brought in states in pairs to keep the parties in 
the same relative position in the House and Senate. 
Springer ended up the voice of the single-state plan, now
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apparently a strong supporter for statehood for the 
territories. It was an ironic switch in events.
Nevertheless, it seemed that Democrat support for a 
single state was in some ways another way to prolong the 
statehood issue. The old program of ignoring the terri­
tories, listing fabricated reasons why they were not 
ready for statehood, could now be traded for a new 
delaying tactic, one that argued whether or not the 
Territory of Dakota should come in as one or two states. 
This new plan could delay the possibility of statehood 
once again. Springer gained strength with his one-state 
plan, in part by an event which occurred in the 
territory.
In November 1887, the territorial legislature 
submitted a referendum to the people of Dakota on the 
question of whether or not division was desired.
Although the measure passed and division was agreed upon, 
the majority of the northern Dakotans voted against 
division.^ The one-state supporters in Dakota and in 
Washington were elated after the returns were analyzed. 
They claimed that even though the divisionists won the 
referendum, the margin was very narrow, indicating that 
non-voters were either against division or did not care 
one way or another. Springer therefore declared it was 
the duty of Congress to protect the ’’existing union" 
rather than divide the territory against the will of so
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many of its inhabitants. "I have earnestly desired," 
Springer continued, "and still desire, the admission of 
Dakota, and will continue to oppose, her dismemberment 
while some of her citizens, perhaps interested in locali­
ties that may be affected by division, may criticize my 
course at this time; yet I feel assured that hereafter 
those who have insisted on single admission will be 
regarded as benefactors of the Territory.
Observers in the territory had another explanation 
of the results. Counties influenced by the Northern 
Pacific Railroad, which desired only one state, were 
inclined to vote against division, indicating the 
pressure of the railroad. On the other hand, counties 
served by the Manitoba and Great Northern lines produced 
votes favoring division. Thomas Niell, resident of 
northern Dakota, claimed that single-state backers were 
working in the counties before the election and convinced 
voters that if they were insistent on division, South 
Dakota would go in as a state, leaving North Dakota a 
territory with no promise of statehood in the near 
future. This was not exactly the slant of the statehood 
bills; however, most Congressmen were inclined to estab­
lish southern Dakota as a state and to allow northern 
Dakota to come in at a future time, generally believed to
Qbe within a year or so.
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Single-state advocates were persuasive in their 
arguments supporting one large state. They believed the 
state could be run less expensively as a single large 
state rather than two small ones. One efficient bureau­
cracy was preferable since it could draw the most 
qualified individuals from the total area. The large 
state would also have more weight in Washington, putting 
it into a better position to deal with older and larger 
states. Washington's Democratic politicians claimed that 
support for dual statehood was simply not there; they 
could not take it upon themselves to grant the wishes of 
the so-called fragmented group of southern Dakotans, they 
needed to look after the interests of the entire 
population. Senator George G. Vest, Democrat from 
Missouri, stated in Congress:
I pledge my word and honor here, and I 
believe that every Democrat present will do the 
same, I will vote for the admission of Dakota 
as one State; but I will not vote for the 
division of Dakota, because I believe that no 
consideration of public policy demands it. I 
believe that State will not be too large, 
considering its climate and soil. We have 
heard the most extravagant panegyric on the 
soil, the climate, the people of Dakota. 
Notwithstanding what we know of that region we 
have heard here of roses and flowers and 
cloudless skies and balmy zephyrs. We have 
heard of a people so elevated, so honest, so 
civilized, so Christianized that hardly any 
population in this country can be brought in 
safe comparision with them.^
Democrats proclaimed they were looking out for the
interests of the entire population. Besides, prospects
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seemed brighter if Congress could bring in one state
expeditiously whereas two states would take more time.
Washington Democrats reflected that Dakotans should be
willing to go this route, as it was preferable to
1 0indefinite territorial status. The final results
proved that the members of the House became side-tracked
once again; they were reluctant to bring the state into
the Union because of its internal disagreements. The
bill granting statehood was shelved, and support for the
measure dissolved. Dakotans again felt statehood, either
as one large state or two smaller states, was in the
distant future. However, the Presidential election of
1888 was awaited with great anticipation. Perhaps a new
Republican administration would fulfill the statehood 
11dream. '
Benjamin Harrison, the Republican Presidential
candidate, who had been a firm supporter of the Dakotans
in the Senate, suspected partisanship rather than lack of
readiness prevented Dakota territory from entering the
Union. "Democrats in the House are determined to control
government at any cost," he remarked in 1887," and they
will not consent to the admission of the new territory
which might by any probability cast its electoral vote
1 Pfor the Republican Presidential ticket." Republicans 
emphasized their support when they put the statehood 
issue in the 1888 Republican Presidential platform, which
1 0 0
called for South Dakota statehood and enabling acts for 
North Dakota, Montana, and Washington. They were, in 
effect, advocating the admission of three Republican 
states and only one Democratic, which would change the 
party balance by providing Republicans a net gain of two 
s t a t e s . 3^ it was not difficult for Democrats to see 
through that this plan.
Victory in 1888 for Republicans therefore meant 
victory for Dakota Territory as well. As it turned out, 
the Republicans swept the election, capturing the 
Presidency and a majority in both the House and Senate of 
the Fifty-first Congress. They were determined to 
fulfill their platform promises to the long-suffering 
territories. Lame-duck Democrats, on the other hand, 
were anxious to salvage something of their Omnibus Bill, 
and they tried to compromise by admitting two Dakotas 
plus Montana, Washington, and New Mexico, three 
potentially Republican states and two potentially 
Democratic states, for a Republican net gain of one 
state. Realizing the President could call a special 
session in the spring, and pondering the complexion of 
the Fifty-first Congress, they decided to try to bring in 
the territories, including southern Dakota, during the 
lame-duck session of the Fiftieth Congress; after all, a 
small Democratic victory was certainly preferable to a 
total Republican triumph. As for North Dakota, it would
1 0 1
simply have to wait its turn. Charles H. Grosvenor, 
Republican Representative of Ohio, declared it was "too 
late for the Democratic party to shield themselves from 
the wrath of the people due to their betrayal of their 
trust in the matter of the Territories, for lo these four 
full years of Democratic administration the Territory of 
Dakota has been ready for admission to the Union. . . . 
She has been kept out of the Union because she is not 
barbarous and treacherous, nor Democratic . . . with the 
hope that the power of the Democratic party might be 
protected for four more years.
The Democrats called a caucus in December 1888 to 
plan their strategy. After much debate, a plan was 
agreed to that called for one Dakota, unless its people 
demanded two; provided for rapid admission of Washington, 
Montana and New Mexico as states; and allowed the admit­
tance of Utah in the future.^
On January 15, 1889, Representative Springer, still 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole in the lame-duck 
session, introduced the Omnibus Bill to the House and 
opened the floor to discussion. The majority of the 
speakers repeated the major arguments in defense of 
Dakota, with little time spent discussing Montana and 
Washington. However, New Mexico presented a problem.
When its merits were investigated, many members felt this 
territory was not ready to become a state because New
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Mexicans did not have sufficient resources .nor did 
Congress feel the "half-breeds" were choice candidates 
for members of the Union.1® Other members, however, 
agreed with Representative William Warner, Republican of 
Missouri. "I honestly doubt— the propriety of admitting 
New Mexico as a State," he announced, "yet if I am driven 
to vote for New Mexico in order to get in the Dakotas, 
Montana, and Washington, I would rather err on the side 
of favoritism to the people of New Mexico than to longer 
continue this burning outrage upon the people of the 
other Territories."1  ^ Representative Byron M.
Cutcheon, Republican from Michigan contended, "I am 
utterly, positively and forever opposed to tying this 
carcass of New Mexico upon the living body of Dakota.
Let it stand on its own basis. Let each stand upon its 
own merit."1® Although many Republican members tried 
to eliminate the comprehensive Omnibus Bill, with the 
undesirable New Mexico included, it passed the House in 
its Democratic form on January 18, 1889-1^
The Senate version of the Omnibus Bill then traveled 
through the Senate Committee on the Territories, no 
longer chaired by Senator Harrison, only to be rejected 
by the Republican-dominated full Senate because of the 
statehood provision that included New Mexico. A confer­
ence of the two houses was called but proved temporarily 
unable to break the dead-lock between the Republican
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Senate and the Democratic House. Finally, when the
session was almost over, House Democrats conceded
everything the Senate wanted. In fact, Congressman
Springer changed his stand completely. He stated, "As
the course of empire is rapidly moving westward, let us
prepare our territories for the coming tide of
population. Let us clothe them with all the habiliments
of statehood. Let us extend to their people all the
rights which we of the states e n j o y . A s  one
unidentified observer remarked, "the Democrats seemed to
be ready to give up everything for which they have held
on, and even implore the Republicans for permission to
give up more, in order to make the new states a feature
P 1of this Congress instead of the next." The final 
Omnibus Bill that emerged from the House was fully 
satisfactory to neither party. On January 18, 1889 the 
House passed the Senate version of the statehood bill,
S. 185, changing it in the process to fit House
pprequirements.
A Committee of Conference, including Springer, then 
met to reconcile conflicting House-Senate versions of the 
bill, and both Houses agreed to back down, agreeing to 
the final Senate bill, which, however, now looked 
something like the House Bill.Springer still fought 
to include New Mexico so that Democrats might anticipate 
two new states; however, in the end he failed, and the
final bill proposed statehood for three potentially 
Republican states and only one potentially Democratic 
state. (As it turns out, the Democratic defeat was even 
worse, for Washington elected a Republican delegation to 
the Fify-first Congress. Springer, a Democrat, sponsored 
a House bill that finally gave the Republicans four new 
states.) The Moderates and some other Democrats felt 
they were forced to accept the situation, and they voted 
accordingly, helping, for example, to exclude New 
Mexico. Springer and the majority of Democrats, however, 
fought to keep in New Mexico, and when that effort 
failed, they attempted to defeat the proposal (item 12) 
and postpone the admission of North Dakota, Montana, and 
Washington by allowing them to write a constitution and 
form state governments, then requiring further 
congressional approval. This would postpone admission at 
least for a time; if apathy developed, it might be a long 
time. On the other hand, Moderates and Republicans 
successfully overcame this challenge; on February 15, 
1889, they secured House passage of an amendment bringing 
in North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington on 
"equal basis", requiring only a Presidential proclamation 
that a proper constitution had been written and approved 
by the people and that state governments were formed 
before the territory actually became a state. The bill 
dropped New Mexico; and it admitted two Dakotas without a
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. 2Unew vote on division by the people of the territory.
When Republicans forced the exclusion of New Mexico, the 
balance read three potential Republican states (the 
Dakotas and Montana) to one potential Democratic state 
(Washington), a Republican gain of two states. For 
Dakota, the long struggle ended when President Cleveland, 
a Democrat, signed the bill on February 22, 1889, during
p nhis last weeks in office. -^
It is interesting to note the sequence of events 
during the early months of 1889* One can readily see the 
pattern of the Democrats. They changed from being 
totally against statehood for Dakota, to backers of the 
single-state plan, finally trying to emerge as the final 
champions, bringing four new states into the Union. They 
only changed their plans when they were forced by the 
Republicans. Dakotans finally entered the Union as two 
states, something most of them had tried to do for 
eighteen years.
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CHAPTER VI
CONGRESSIONAL ALIGNMENTS
Ironically, the Democrats, who were responsible for 
the ultimate achievement of statehood for the two 
Dakotas, were also (as most sources used indicate), 
responsible for the long delay. Using Rice-Beyle cluster 
bloc analysis, this conclusion can be tested precisely by 
measuring the extent to which each Representative voted 
with every other Representative, grouping together in a 
bloc those whose voting behavior tended to be similar.
In order to qualify for membership in a particular bloc, 
each legislator must vote the same as all other members 
of the bloc on at least eighty percent of the twelve 
pertinent statehood roll calls. Fringe members for each 
bloc are those who agreed on at least seventy percent of 
the votes, with at least fifty percent of the members of 
the bloc. A complete list of the relevant roll calls is 
in Appendix 2.
The members of the House divided into three blocs 
(see Table 1). The first, composed of members who were 
strong supporters of Dakota Territory, favored two 
states. Its membership included 132 Republicans and one
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Democrat for a total of 133 members. The fringe 
consisted of six more members, five Republicans and one 
Democrat. These legislators will be called 
Divisionists.
TABLE 1
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY PARTY* 
STATEHOOD ISSUE
REPUBLICANS DEMOCRATS 11 TOTAL
DIVISIONIST 132 ( 98%) 1 ( 1%) 11 133 ( 49%)
MODERATE 1 ( 1%) 14 ( 10%) 11 15 ( 6%)
ANTI-STATEHOOD 2 ( 1%) 119 ( 89%) 11
11
121 ( 45%)
TOTAL 135 (100%) 134 (100%) 11 269 /---**oo
*In this, as in all tables, the fringes are not tabu­
lated. Also not included are the members who did not 
have sufficient voting records. A complete list of these 
members can be found in Appendix 4.
The second, Moderate, bloc was a very small group 
with only 15 members, including 14 Democrats (with four 
more in the fringe) and one Republican (with none in the 
fringe). It is perhaps somewhat misleading to set this 
group aside as a separate bloc because it usually voted 
with the third bloc; the only difference was that the 
members were more or less willing to cooperate with
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Republicans for the purpose of providing the Dakotas with 
statehood and evidently wanted to claim some credit for 
achieving it.
The third bloc disapproved of statehood for all of 
Dakota Territory. It continually voted against the 
measures that would facilitate speedy admission. Of the 
121 members, only two were Republicans, while 119 were 
Democrats. The fringe, consisting of 10 members, was all 
Democrat. This is an anti-statehood bloc, in the sense 
that it opposed separate statehood for North Dakota.
Table 1 indicates that the Republicans were over­
whelmingly in favor of the statehood question while the 
Democrats appear to be almost equally polarized against 
it. This general table cannot serve as our only basis 
for analysis because it does not indicate whether or not 
there was any sectional voting.
Table 2 indicates that both North-South and East- 
West splits, showing most northerners (69 percent) 
supported statehood, while southerners were closer to 
unanimity on the opposite side of the issue (84 percent); 
however, some of this heavy southern influence is 
explained by the behavior of the Democratic solid South. 
Of the 92 representatives from the States of the 
Confederacy plus Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, and 
Missouri, 81 were Democrats and only 11 were 
Republicans. The East-West division is less defined,
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indicating its basic irrelevance to the question. 
Westerners generally favored the issue and easterners 
split evenly. Conclusions at this point would indicate 
that Republicans, northerners, and westerners (in that 
order) supported the territories, while Democrats, 
southerners, and easterners opposed them.
TABLE 2
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION 
STATEHOOD ISSUE
NORTH SOUTH 11 TOTAL
DIVISIONIST 122 ( 69%) 11 ( 12%) 11 133 ( 49%)
MODERATE 1 1 ( 6%) 4 ( 4%) 11 15 ( 6%)
ANTI-STATEHOOD 44 ( 25%) 77 ( 84%) 11
11
121 ( 45%)
TOTAL 177 (100%) 92 (100%) 11 269 (100%)
WEST EAST 11 TOTAL
DIVISIONIST 30 ( 61%) 1 03 ( 47%) 11 133 ( 49%)
MODERATE 2 ( 4%) 13 ( 6%) 11 15 ( 6%)
ANTI-STATEHOOD 17 ( 35%) 1 04 ( 47%) 11
1
1
121 ( 45%)
TOTAL 49 (100%) 220 (100%) 11 269 (100%)
In order to underscore the partisan nature of the 
statehood issue, as indicated in Table 1, Table 3 indi­
cates the assignable number of representatives in each 
region. Seventy percent of the northerners were 
Republicans, corresponding to the 69 percent northern pro­
division vote in Table 2. The third table also shows 88 
percent of the southerners were Democrats, which closely 
matches the moderate plus anti-statehood vote in Table 
2. Since we associate Republicans with the pro-division 
vote and the Democrats with the anti-statehood vote, 
conclusions at this point confirm that the north-south 
split is actually a reflection of the Republican- 
Democratic split. Since most Republicans lived in the 
North, naturally the North would favor division; of 
course the reverse applies for the South. The eastern 
states, as shown on Table 3, show a relatively even split 
as far as party is concerned. This same statistic is 
reflected in Table 2, where the eastern vote is 47 
percent for division and 47 percent anti-statehood.
Western states' representatives voted slightly more often 
on the pro side, again corresponding to the higher number 
of Republicans in the western states.
TABLE 3
TOTAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN RESPECTIVE SECTIONS 
WITH BLOC ASSIGNABLE VOTING RECORDS 
STATEHOOD ISSUE
NORTH SOUTH 11 TOTAL
REPUBLICAN 124 ( 70%) 1 1 ( 12%) ! 135 ( 50%)
DEMOCRAT 53 ( 30%) 81 /—NGOoo'—y ! 134
1
1
( 50%)
TOTAL 177 (100%) 92 (100%) ! 269 o o *** V./
WEST EAST 11 TOTAL
REPUBLICAN 32 ( 65%) 1 03 ( 47%) ! 135 ( 50%)
DEMOCRAT 17 ( 35%) 117 ( 53%) ! 134
11
( 50%)
TOTAL 49 (100%) 220 (100%) ! 269 (100%)
Table 4 further emphasizes Republican favor for 
statehood and Democratic opposition. Sectionalism was 
hardly a factor concerning the territories. As reflected 
in Table 4, eastern Republicans, with 99 percent; western 
Republicans, with 94 percent; southern Republicans, with 
100 percent; and northern Republican, with 98 percent;
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TABLE 4
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY SECTION, CONTROLLING FOR PARTY
STATEHOOD ISSUE
DEMOCRATS 11
WESTERN EASTERN 11 TOTAL
DIVISION 1ST 0 ( 0%) 1 ( 1%) 11 1 ( 1%)
MODERATE 1 ( 6%) 13 ( 11%) 11 1 4 ( 10%)
ANTI-STATEHOOD 16 ( 94%) 103 ( 88%) 11
11
119 ( 89%)
TOTAL 17 (100%) 117 (100%) 11 1 34 (100%)
REPUBLICANS 11
WESTERN EASTERN 11 TOTAL
DIVISIONIST 30 ( 94%) 1 02 ( 99%) 11 132 ( 98%)
MODERATE 1 ( 3%) 0 ( 0%) 11 1 ( 1%)
ANTI-STATEHOOD 1 ( 3%) 1 ( 1%) 11
11
2 ( 1%)
TOTAL 32 (100%) 1 03 (100%) 11 135 (100%)
TABLE 4 (Continued)
DEMOCRATS 11
NORTHERN SOUTHERN 11 TOTAL
DIVISIONIST 1 ( 2%) 0 ( 0%) 11 1 ( 1%)
MODERATE 10 ( 19%) 4 ( 5%) 11 14 6%Os_'
STATEHOOD 42 ( 79%) 77 ( 95%) 11
1
1
119 ( 89%)
TOTAL 53 (100%) 81 (100%) 11
1
1
1 34 (100%)
REPUBLICANS 11
NORTHERN SOUTHERN 11 TOTAL
DIVISIONIST 121 ( 98%) 1 1 (100%) 11 1 32 COo\
MODERATE 1 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 11 1 ( 1%)
ANTI-STATEHOOD 2 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 11
11
2 ( 1%)
TOTAL 124 (100%) 1 1 (100%) 11 135 (100%)
all favored statehood. On the opposite side, Democrats 
in the east, west, south and north voted against it, with 
somewhat less unanimity. It made no difference whether a 
member was from the north, south, east or west. His vote 
shows his political affiliation was more important than
120
his sectional ties, underlining the partisan nature of 
the statehood question in an era when House and Senate 
majorities were often very narrow and each new Senator or 
Representative might change the complexion of Congress by 
altering the balance of party control. In the Fiftieth 
Congress, in which Harrison served on the Committee of 
the Territories (not as Chairman, as he did in the Forty- 
ninth Congress) the Republicans controlled the Senate by 
only 39 to 37. No wonder Democrats were suspicious of
pthe political leanings of new states!
Originally, I believed there would be some signifi­
cant sectional split, especially east-west. Since the 
territories were located near the western states, I 
assumed the latter would feel some sympathy for the 
plight of their neighbors. However, roll call analysis 
confirms that a westerner voted his party line. This 
proved to be one of the most revealing aspects of my 
findings. Many times the members would state they were 
fellow westerners, and therefore in complete accord with 
the territories' efforts. Nevertheless, when the time 
came for the vote to be cast, their western pride turned 
to partisan obedience. One would also have expected that 
easterners would be skeptical about the admission of four 
new western states at once, for it would have the effect 
of further diluting their political power. This eastern 
reluctance to promote western expansion had been present
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from the early days of the Republic. Perhaps easterners 
were resigned to the fact that this process would con­
tinue until all territories had become states; perhaps, 
also, their instinct for party survival was simply 
stronger than their sectional feelings.
Furthermore, and almost as significant, the Omnibus 
Bill, admitting North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and 
Washington, followed party lines even more strictly than 
the historiography of the period (which claims support, 
not unanimity) has implied. As pointed out earlier in 
this paper, it was ironic that the political party 
responsible for barring statehood for Dakota was indeed 
the same party that ended up granting the same in the 
end. Democrats, originally the strongest opponents of 
the admission of Dakota as a state, changed from total 
non-support to acceptance of a single-state plan. After 
the Republicans were unwilling to back down from their 
original dual-statehood proposition, sufficient Democrats 
finally agreed to this as well. Springer, one of the 
strongest Democrats, actually formulated the Omnibus 
Bill. His support, along with that of other Democrats, 
was only there at the last minute when they realized they 
had no other alternative. Democrats were indeed holding 
up statehood for the territories. Political control of 
the House of Representatives meant more to them than 
unenfranchised citizens. Dakota Territory was ready and
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willing to become a state ten years prior to admission, 
but it had to wait until the Democrats were forced into 
the position of either fighting or joining a statehood 
movement which, after the 1888 national election, was 
clearly going to be successful.
A further study was conducted to investigate to what 
extent partisanship played a role in entire Congress of 
1888-1889, both the House and the Senate. Using the 
identical program utilized to track the Dakota statehood 
issue in the second session of the Fiftieth Congress, and 
cluster-bloc analysis, I carefully analyzed the results 
of the pairwise comparisons of all voting that occurred 
in both sessions of the Fiftieth Congress. Since I had 
found partisan voting was the normal way of conducting 
business when I experimented with the statehood issue, I 
assumed the same would apply to other issues which passed 
through Congress. The results were predictable, yet 
surprising in their degree of agreement. Again to state 
the criteria of the blocs: in order to become a member of 
a bloc, a congressman must vote the same as all other 
members of the bloc on at least eighty percent of the 
roll calls. It is obvious from this statement that they 
did not vote exactly the same on each and every issue. 
However, it should be pointed out that eighty percent 
agreement is remarkable, considering the diversity and 
complexity of Congress.
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TABLE 5
BLOCS REPRESENTED BY PARTY, 50TH CONGRESS 
TOTAL BUSINESS
REPUBLICAN
BLOC-POSITION
DEMOCRAT
BLOC-POSITION
TOTAL
REPUBLICAN
CONGRESSMEN
154 ( 98.7%)
2 ( 1.3%)
156 (100.0%)
DEMOCRATIC
CONGRESSMEN
9 ( 5.4%)
158 ( 94.6%)
167 (1 00.0 %)
TOTAL
163 ( 50.5%) 
160 ( 49.5%) 
323 (1 00.0 %)
The House of Representatives of the Fiftieth 
Congress contained 323 members (156 Republicans, 167 
Democrats) in the 1888-1889 session, and they voted on a 
total of 320 roll calls (see Table 5 above). Using the 
cluster-bloc program, the group broke into two very 
distinct groups, directly along party lines. Beginning 
with the Democrats, only nine members (5.4 percent) voted 
with the Republican bloc. Basically, the Democrats voted 
cohesively on all of the isues brought before the House; 
however, they do not belong to "a" bloc with as much 
certainty as I found on the statehood question. They 
fragmented more within the bloc into sub-blocs or mini­
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blocs, yet all voting a basic Democratic line. The 
Republicans, on the other hand, formed a solid group.
Only two members (1.3 percent) voted with the Democrats 
at all. The Republicans’ degree of agreement was also 
much higher, the majority of them paring with each other 
at 80 percent or more. Again, this group was, to some 
degree, less well defined than the corresponding bloc on 
the Dakota issue. It is of interest to note that both 
parties were able to command the solid allegiance of 
their rank and file in the House, for they voted with 
each other and not with the opposite party, at least at 
the 80 percent level used to define a voting bloc. The 
House of Representatives of the Fiftieth Congress was 
conclusively a partisan group of voting members, much 
more so than in our own time.
It should be noted that such intense partisanship 
also meant that a small group of as few as fifteen men 
could have a decisive role in the final vote. It was 
apparent that the statehood issue, although always firmly 
supported by the Republican party, finally was brought in 
by the House whose majority was Democratic. It was the 
action of a small group of Democrats who finally voted 
for the statehood bill, determining the final result.
The motivation of these men is now lost to time; however, 
one can speculate that they either were men of convic­
tion, willing to put aside the party voice, or, acting on
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orders from the Democratic party, they were perhaps 
realistic about the fact that Republicans would bring in 
new territories regardless what they did in this 
Congress. In any case, the statehood issue was deter­
mined by this small group of Democrats.
Similarly, the Senate's complexion proved no less 
partisan. The Senate of the Fiftieth Congress had 77 
members. The political breakdown was about even, with 37 
Democrats and 39 Republicans. The Senate voted on 389 
roll calls in the 1888-1889 session. It is striking to 
discover that like the House, it broke into two blocs 
along strict party lines. The matrix, with its text-book 
archetype, is perfectly set, with the 37 Democrats voting 
together in one bloc, and the 39 Republicans voting in 
the other bloc. The Senate was decisively partisan in 
character. It voted according to party standing on all 
of the issues regardless of content or apparent personal 
reflection. It can only be speculation whether or not 
the party dictated the vote on a particular issue; 
however, it would be most remarkable if each and every 
member of either the Republican or Democratic party were 
absolutely devoted members with identical beliefs and
convictions.
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^Because fringe members only voted with their bloc 
70 per cent of the time, they have been eliminated from 
the following statistics. The complete list of all blocs 
and fringes may be found in Appendix 3.
2U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistic 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 
D.C.: IT ST Government Printing Office, 19^0), p. 691.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The objective of this thesis was to discover the 
reasons why statehood for Dakota Territory took twenty- 
eight years to accomplish. I found there were several 
issues in the territorial period that delayed statehood, 
including bond repudiation, an effort to change the 
constitution after its submission to Congress and 
approval by the Senate, the efforts of Governor Ordway to 
keep Dakota under his control, and uncertain results of 
key referendums. Dakota was, at times, its own worst 
enemy. Splitting into fragmented groups, it often did 
not have a comprehensive and organized program to 
follow. This apparent disorganization was viewed in 
Washington with apathy, causing politicans to ignore the 
distant territory. In addition, the territory was insist­
ent that it wanted to enter the Union as two states and 
not one large, clumsy state. This too caused delay, as 
it was somewhat out of the ordinary to split territories 
into more than one state, both of which would be admitted 
immediately.
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Washington politicans were also partially to blame 
for the long delays. The House and Senate were 
controlled by the same party only for a short time after 
1875, leading to an intense partisan struggle over the 
territories between the Republicans and the Democrats.
The Republicans were supportive of the Territory of 
Dakota and were willing to bring it into the Union by 
1886. The Democrats, on the other hand, blocked 
statehood time and time again. The key to the entire 
issue was partisan politics, leading to constant and 
extended delay. Dakotans were delayed by their own 
disorganization, they were delayed by politics of their 
era, and they were delayed by one political party, the 
Democrats. It is no surprise that the statehood movement 
was riddled with problems the entire time.
My hypothesis was correct in attributing to the 
Democratic Party the long delay in statehood for Dakota. 
Even though this point was strongly supported by the 
historiography of the period and by modern historians, 
this study carries this fact one step further. I found 
that it was indeed true that Democrats were unreceptive 
towards the territory and chose to ignore it for many 
years. Nevertheless, they were the party which finally 
brought Dakota into the Union in 1889.
At this point cluster bloc analysis was especially 
useful. I have noted that on occasion a legislator’s
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opinion as expressed in his speeches was not reflected in 
his voting record. One could not determine exactly who 
supported North Dakota statehood and who did not, simply 
by looking at the vote on final passage, for that was a 
voice vote. Furthermore, most of the roll calls really 
involved more than one question; the simplified discus­
sion in the text and appendix 2 does not reflect that. 
There were, in fact, no single roll call issues that were 
clearly indicative of support for North Dakota and no 
other issue, although there were two clear-cut votes on 
the New Mexico issue, which might help some other 
historian. By comparing voting behavior on a number of 
issue-related roll calls, however, I could pinpoint 
congressmen whose attitudes were Divisionist, Moderate, 
or opposed to immediate statehood for North Dakota.
For example, Representative Springer led Democrats 
in the House of Representives in the fight to pass the 
Omnibus Bill, which would have admitted North Dakota 
promptly. But when the votes were counted, Springer was 
sometimes found in the Anti-Statehood block. How is this 
to be explained?
First of all, many of the key votes on the Omnibus 
Bill were voice votes; they must remain outside our 
scope. Also, Springer was not in the Moderate Block of 
Democrats because (like the vast majority of Democrats) 
he was not as willing as the Moderates were to vote with
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Republicans on all of the various parliamentary maneuvers 
prior to passage of the Omnibus Bill, nor was he willing 
to grant more than a two-state advantage to the 
Republicans. Note in Appendix 2, which lists the twelve 
relevant roll calls, that some of them are procedural and 
none of them is a vote on final passage. Springer was 
determined to have some bill passed under the sponsorship 
of the Democrats. With the help of the bloc of fifteen, 
the Moderates, all Democrats except one Independent 
Republican, he succeeded. In January 1889, Springer 
secured the passage of his substitute in the House; this 
bill provided for the division of Dakota Territory and 
the prompt entry of North Dakota and the other states 
into the Union. The fifteen Moderates supported him in 
this effort and, in four of the five roll calls 
pertaining to the issue, they provided the margin of 
victory. (The four fringe Moderates, all Democrats, were 
also supportive).
Once his substitute became the House bill, however, 
Springer and the Moderates were no longer in agreement.
On six of the remaining seven roll calls, Moderates 
opposed Springer (on the roll call number ten only five 
Moderates voted, and they were split). The Democratic 
leader fought to bring in New Mexico, which would have 
been a Democratic state. The Moderates opposed him,
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evidently in the belief that insistence on the New Mexico 
question would endanger the entire package.
The Moderates voted against Springer and their party 
in February 1889. These roll calls are more difficult to 
classify. Two were votes to adjourn, and the moderates 
split on one of them. But this small bloc seems to have 
been more insistent than Springer and the other Democrats 
that South Dakota should come in with the Sioux Falls 
Constitution of 1885 if it wished, and that North Dakota 
be admitted without delay due to submission of the 
division question to a local referendum or due to any 
further required action by Congress. Perhaps this is 
indicative of a commitment to democratic ideals; perhaps 
it indicates pragmatic acceptance of the political power 
of the Republican Party. The Moderates were not the 
swing vote on these roll calls, but the fourteen 
Democratic Moderates who were present and voting did vote 
against their own party leadership.
It was interesting to discover the inner workings of 
the Democratic Party at that time. My research indicates 
that from 1861 to 1886, Democrats were adamantly opposed 
to bringing in any new states. However, in December 
1886, Springer first introduced the Omnibus Bill, which 
indicated a change in Democratic strategy. The new plan 
called for Democratic support of the western territories 
and stressed the need to bring not one, but four states
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into the Union. Activity was intense as the party tried 
to make this statehood issue something it could 
capitalize on instead of ending up labeled as the party 
that did not support the admission of new states.
A great deal of trading went on in the second 
session of the Fiftieth Congress, the Senate passing one 
bill, which traveled over to the House only to be 
rejected, amended, and then returned with variations.
The actual votes in the committees were not recorded in 
either the House or the Senate, therefore it was diffi­
cult to pinpoint who exactly was supporting certain 
issues or bills. But it is clear that Democrats quickly 
realized that if they failed to bring in the states, 
including some with Democratic tendencies, the 
Republicans would bring in Dakota for sure the following 
congressional session, and might leave out altogether the 
territories that were Democratic.
Democrats realized that a trade of sorts could be 
arranged to guarantee at least some Democratic states. 
They never lost sight of their original party goal, which 
was to keep out any territories that were not of their 
party unless, if all else failed, they must be brought in 
by pairs to insure that Republican and Democratic states 
joined the Union together. The last few months of the 
Fiftieth Congress saw the emergence of a moderate bloc of 
Democrats who, by their presence, softened the issue
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sufficiently to permit statehood for Dakota along with 
the other territories. They apparently wanted to save 
something out of the party's inevitable defeat on the 
issue. It was because of their support for division of 
Dakota Territory that key votes on the Omnibus Bill•
permitted North Dakota to receive the necessary 
majority. The Moderate Democrats, even though they were 
small in number, actually made statehood possible for 
North Dakota, as well as supporting South Dakota,
Montana, and Washington. It was indeed an ironic twist 
in events.
Equally partisan however, the Republicans happened 
to be on the correct side of the territorial issue for 
Dakota. They professed for many years that they were 
indeed the party of the territories, always willing to go 
out on a limb for the unenfranchised citizens. Again, 
knowing the political structure of the parties of the 
post-Civil War congresses, one wonders if they would have 
been so willing to go to the lengths they did if Dakota 
would have been controlled by Democrats. Probably not, 
for Republicans managed to keep out New Mexico, which 
would have elected Democrats to Congress. Republicans 
were just as partisan as Democrats were; however, most 
historians since statehood have overlooked that fact. In 
the end, statehood was attained for Dakota partially 
because of Republicans laboring to bring in the
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territories as soon as possible, and partially because 
Democrats did not want to make the territorial issue a 
liability in the next election.
The final analysis of the Fiftieth Congress of the 
United States proves the hypothesis that the Democratic 
Party blocked statehood for Dakota Territory and the 
Republican Party tried for many years to assist the terri­
tory in joining the Union. It was quite revealing to 
note that political parties had such absolute control 
over their members. With the assistance of cluster bloc 
analysis, I was able to indicate the degree to which 
Democrats voted with Democrats, following party policy, 
and Republicans voted with Republicans.
Voting behavior during the 1888-1889 congressional 
year was revealing in two ways. First, the House broke 
into two specific party blocs. It was rather amazing 
that party voting was as strong as it was, considering 
323 individuals were represented, indicating about as 
close to perfect party alignment as one will ever see. 
Second, it was exciting to note to what degree the Senate 
also voted along party lines; the blocs were even more 
distinct, indicating even greater party loyalty. As it 
turns out, partisanship was truly reflected in the 
Fiftieth Congress of the United States. This is typical 
of the voting behavior of Gilded Age congressmen and in 
sharp contrast to legislative alignments in a modern
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congress. Although findings do not indicate 100 percent
adherence to party, evidence nevertheless supports the
contention that Democrats voted solidly with Democrats,
and Republicans with Republicans.
North and South Dakota each called constitutional
conventions during the summer of 1889. The delegates
agreed on the division line in the territory, disposed of
all common debts and liabilities, divided the public
1buildings, and separated the respective debt. Voters 
approved both constitutions in October of 1889.2 
President Harrison signed the proclamation on November 2, 
1889, admitting North and South Dakota to the Union. He 
signed his name to the proper papers without revealing 
which state came in first. Harrison allegedly explained 
his action by saying, "they were born together, they were 
one, and I will make them twins."3
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1Black, "History of the State Constitutional 
Convention of 1889," pp. 128-53, offers a detailed 
synopsis of the North Dakota Convention.
^Schell, History of South Dakota, p. 222; 
Loundsberry, North Dakota History, 1:410—11. It is 
interesting to note that in the election of congressmen 
and senators for the Fifty-first Congress, Dakota did 
elect all Republican politicians. Biographical 
Directory of the American Congress, 1774 — 1971 
(Washington, Dl C. : United States Government Printing 
Office, 1971), pp. 715, 1000, 1064, 1428, 1535, 1543.
The new members from South Dakota were, Richard F. 
Pettigrew, Gideon C. Moody, Oscar S. Gifford, John A. 
Pickier. Those from North Dakota included Lyman R.
Casey, Gilbert Pierce, and Henry C. Hansbrough.
^Kingsbury, History of Dakota, 2:1935. In the 
years 1889-1890, territories formed in the 1860's were 
established as six new states: Washington, Idaho, 
Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Elben, 
First and Second Empires, p. 6.
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APPENDIX 2
ROLL CALLS ON STATEHOOD ISSUE
The following roll calls were used in the analysis:
1. Measure is an amendment submitted by MacDonald to 
Springer's substitute for Senate Bill S. 185, "to provide 
for the admission of the State of Dakota into the Union, 
and for the organization of the Territory of North 
Dakota."
Vote is yea 117, nay 122, not voting 83. Amendment is 
rejected.
Issue is whether Dakota Territory should be divided and 
North Dakota admitted immediately with the other states 
(Springer), or whether Dakota Territory should be divided 
and North Dakota admitted in the future after writing a 
constitution and forming a government (MacDonald).
Result is to accept Springer's amendment in the nature 
of a substitute, thus proposing to admit North Dakota 
immediately.
Congressional Record, p. 93^; Journal, p. 290;
January T"8^ 1 889.
2. Measure is an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, offered by Springer to divide Dakota 
Territory and admit North Dakota immediately with South 
Dakota, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico.
Vote is yea 133, nay 120, not voting 69. Amendment is 
rejected.
Issue is whether Dakota Territory should be divided and 
North Dakota admitted immediately with South Dakota, 
Montana, Washington, and New Mexico (Springer), or 
whether Dakota Territory should be divided and North 
Dakota admitted in the future after writing a 
constitution and forming a government (Senate bill).
Result is to accept Springer's amendment in the nature 
of a substitute, thus proposing to admit North Dakota 
immediately.
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Congressional Record, p. 949; Journal, p. 293; 
January TS^  1 889*
3. Measure is motion by Baker to recommit the bill, 
which is now Springer’s substitute, with instructions to 
report separate bills admitting South Dakota and proving 
enabling acts for North Dakota, Montana, and Washington.
Vote is yea 118, nay 131, not voting 73. Motion is 
rejected .
Issue is whether Dakota Territory should be divided and 
North Dakota admitted immediately with South Dakota, 
Montana, Washington, and New Mexico (Springer), or 
whether Dakota Territory should be divided and North 
Dakota admitted in the future after writing a constitu­
tion and forming a government (Baker).
Result is to continue consideration of Springer’s 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, thus proposing 
to admit North Dakota immediately.
Congressional Record, p. 950; Journal, p. 295;
January i”8"j 1 889-
4. Measure is to pass the bill, which is now Springer's 
substitute .
Vote is yea 145, nay 98, not voting 79. Bill is 
passed.
Issue is whether to pass the bill in the form of the 
Springer amendment (which divides Dakota Territory and 
admits North Dakota immediately with South Dakota, 
Montana, Washington, and New Mexico), or to deliberate 
further the original Senate version (which divides Dakota 
Territory and admits North Dakota in the future after 
writing a constitution and forming a government).
Result is to pass the bill, thus proposing to admit 
North Dakota immediately.
Congressional Record, p. 951; Journal, p. 296; 
January TlTj 1 889.
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5. Measure is the preamble to the bill, referring to the 
desire of the people of South Dakota to be admitted under 
the constitution adopted in 1885.
Vote is yea 91, nay 108, not voting 123. Preamble is 
rejected.
Issue is whether to revise the preamble to include 
referenced to the 1885 constitution for South Dakota.
Result is to omit reference to the 1885 constitution 
for South Dakota in the preamble.
Congressional Record, p. 952; Journal, p. 297; 
January ilTJ 1 889.
6. Measure is to accept that portion of the report of
the Conference Committee that recomme nds that New Mexico
be excluded from the bill. •
Vote is yea 135, nay 105,, not voting 83. That portion
of the Conference Committee report is accepted.
Issue is whether to admit New 
Result is to refuse statehood
Mexico to statehood, 
to New Mexico.
Congressional Record, p. 1912; Journal, p. 497; 
February 1 889.
7. Measure is to table a motion to reconsider item
Vote is yea 136, nay 109, not voting 77. Motion to 
reconsider is tabled.
Issue is whether to admit New Mexico to statehood.
Result is to refuse statehood to New Mexico.
Congressional Record, p. 1913; Journal, p. 499;
February 1 889.
six.
8. Measure is Mr. Cox’s motion to accept that portion of 
the report of the Conference Committee that South Dakota 
be admitted under the Sioux Falls constitution if the 
voters approve it, and that portion of the report of the
1 42
Conference Committee that provides a referendum on the 
constitution but not on division of the territory.
Vote is yea 137, nay 103, not voting 82. Motion is 
accepted.
Issue is whether to resubmit the South Dakota 
constitution to the voters, and whether to permit the 
division of Dakota Territory without further voter 
approval.
Result is that South Dakota's admission under the Sioux 
Falls constitution is approved if the voters desire it, 
and Dakota Territory will be divided without further 
voter approval.
Congressional Record, p. 1913; Journal, p. 500;
February Hi” 1 889.
9. Measure is a motion to adjourn the House.
Vote is yea 82, nay 143, not voting 97- Motion is 
defeated .
Issue is whether to continue deliberation on the 
Conference Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Result is to continue deliberation on the Conference 
Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Congressional Record, p. 1914; Journal, p. 501;
February TTj 1869-
10. Measure is a motion to adjourn the House.
Vote is yea 86, nay 120, not voting 116. Motion is 
defeated.
Issue is whether to continue deliberation on the 
Conference Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Result is to continue deliberation on the Conference 
Committee report on the Omnibus Bill.
Congressional Record, p .
February 14, 1889.
1915; Journal, p. 502;
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11. Measure is a motion to reconsider item eight and to 
table it.
Vote is yea 145, nay 110, not voting 57. Motion is 
tabled.
Issue is whether to resubmit the South Dakota 
consitution to the voters, and whether to permit the 
division of Dakota Territory without further voter 
approval.
Result is that South Dakota’s admisson under the Sioux 
Falls constitution is approved if the voters desire it, 
and Dakota Territory will be divided without further 
voter approval.
Congressional Record, p. 1939; Journal, p. 508;
February V5] 1889.
12. Measure is motion that North Dakota, Montana, and 
Washington be admitted on the same basis and by 
proclamation of the President.
Vote is yea 135, nay 105, not voting 83. The motion is 
accepted.
Issue is whether North Dakota, Montana, and Washington 
shall be admitted by Presidential proclamation or after 
congressional approval.
Result is that North Dakota, Montana, and Washington 
shall not be required to risk further delay at the hands 
of Congress.
Congressional Record, p. 1940; Journal, p. 510; 
February Vb~, 1 889.
APPENDIX 3
BLOC STRUCTURE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ON 12 ROLL CALLS, 50th CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION
BLOC 1
Representatives Party-State
Adams R-IL Gest R-IL
A lien R-MS Grosvenor R-OH
Allen R-MC Grout R-VT
Anderson R-KA Guenther R-WS
Arnold R-RI Harmer R-PA
Atkinson R-PA Haugen R-WS
Baker I-NY Hayden R-MS
Bayne R-PA Henderson R-IA
Belden R-NY Henderson R-IL
Bingham R-PA Hermann R-OR
Boothman R-OH Hiestand R-PA
Bound R-PA Hires R-N J
Boutelle R-ME Hitt R-IL
Bowden R-VA Holmes R-IA
Brewer R-MC Hopkins R-IL
Brower R-NC Hopkins R-NY
Brown R-OH Hunter R-KY
Brown R-VA Jackson R-PA
Browne R-IN Johnston R-ID
Buchanan R-N J Kean R-N J
Burrows R-MC Kelly R-PA
Butler R-TN Kennedy R-OH
Butterworth R-OH Kerr R-IA
Cannon R-IL Ketcham R-NY
Caswell R-WS Laidlaw R-NY
Cheadle R-IN LaFollette R-WS
Clark R-WS Lehlback R-N J
Cogswell R-MS Lind R-MN
Conger R-IA Lodge R-MS
Cooper R-OH Long R-MS
Crouse R-OH McComas R-MD
Cutcheon R-MC McCormick R-PA
Dalzell R-PA McCullough R-PA
Morrill R-KA McKenna R-CA
Dariington R-PA McKinely R-OH
Davis R-MS Milliken R-ME
Delano R-NY Mof fitt R-NY
Dingley R-ME Morrill R-KA
Dorsey R-NB Nelson R-MN
Dunham R-IL Nichols R-NC
F arquhar R-NY 0 'Donnell R-MC
F indlay R-KY 0 'Neil R-PA
Flood R-NY Osborne R-PA
F ord D-MC Owen R-MC
Fuller R-IA Parker R-NY
F unston R-KA Patton R-PA
Gaines R-VA Payson R-IL
Gallinger R-NH Perkins R-KA
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Peters
Phelps
Plumb
Posey
Post
Pugsley
Reed
Rockwell
Romei s
Rowell
Russell
Ryan
Sawyer
Scull
Seymour
Sherman
Spooner
Steele
Stephenson
Stewart
Strubble
Symes
Taylor, E.
Taylor, J.
Thomas
Thomas
Thomas
Thompson
Turner
Vandever
Wade
Weber
White
Whiting
Wickham
Williams
Woodburn
BLOC 1
Representative s Par ty-State
R-KA
R-NJ
R-IL
R-IN
R-IL
R-OH
R-ME
R-MS
R-OH
R-IL
R-CT
R-KA
R-NY
R-PA
R-MC
R-NYR-RI
R-ID
R-OH
R-VT
R-IA
R-CO
R-OH
R-OH
R-KY
R-IL
R-WS
R-OH
R-KA
R-CA
R-MO
R-NY
R-NY
R-MS
R-MS
R-OH
R-NV
U6
FRINGE-BLOC 1
Representatives_______________ Party-State
Baker R-IL 
Biggs D-CA 
Warner R-MO 
White R-IL 
Wilber R-NY 
Yardley R-PA
BLOC 2
Representatives________________ Party-State
Anderson I-IA*
Bliss D-NY
Cox D-NY
Dargan D-SC
Morse D-MS
Perry D-SC
Phelan D-TN
Russell D-MS
Shively D-IN
Sowden D-PA
Thompson D-CA
Tillman D-SC
Townshend D-IL
Vance D-CT
Yoder D-OH
independent Republican
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FRINGE-BLOC 2 
Representative
Chipman 
Ermentrout 
MacDonald 
Tar sney
Party-State
D-MC
D-PA
D-MN
D-MC
149
BLOC 3
Representatives Par ty-State
Abbott D-TX Hare D-TX
Anderson D-IL Hatch D-MO
Anderson D-MI Hayes D-IA
Bacon D-NY Heard D-MO
Bankhead D-AL Hemphill D-SC
Barnes D-GA Henderson D-NC
Barry D-MI Herbert D-AL
Blanchard D-LA Holman D-ID
Bland D-MO Hooker D-MI
Blount D-GA Hopkins I-VA
Breckinridge D-KY Howard D-IN
Buckalew D-PA Hudd D-WS
Bynum D-ID Hutton D-MO
Campbell, F. D-NY Johnston D-NC
Campbell D-OH Jones D-AL
Campbell, T. D-NY Kilgore D-TX
Candler D-GA Laffoon D-KY
Carleton D-GA Lagan D-LA
Caruth D-KY Landes D-IL
Cathings D-MI Lane D-IL
Clardy D-MO Lanham D-TX
Clements D-GA Latham D-NC
Cobb D-AL Lawler D-IL
Compton D-MD Mai sh D-PA
Cothran D-SC Mansur D-MO
Cowles D-NC Martin D-TX
Crain D-TX Matson D-IN
Crisp D-GA McAdoo D-N J
Culberson D-TX McClammy D-NC
Cummings D-NY McCreary D-KY
Davidson D-AL McKinney R-NH
Davidson D-FL McMillin D-TN
Dibble D-SC McRae D-AK
Dockery D-MO Merr iman D-NY
Dougherty D-FL Mills D-TX
Dunn D-AK Montgomery D-KY
Elliott D-SC Moore D-TX
Enloe D-TN Morgan D-MI
Ermentrout D-PA Morse D-MS
F isher D-MC Newton D-LA
Foran D-OH Norwood D-GA
Forney D-AL Oates D-AL
French D-CT Oferrall D-VA
Gibson D-MD 0 'Neil D-MO
Glass D-TN Outhwaite D-OH
Grimes D-GA Peel D-AK
Hall D-PA Randall D-PA
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BLOC 3
Representative
Rice
Richardson
Robertson
Rogers
Sayers
Seney
Shaw
Smith
Spinola
Spr inger
Stewart
Stewart
Stockdale
Stone
Stone
Taulbee
Tillman
Townshend
Tracy
Turner
Walker
Washington
Weaver
Wheeler
Wilkinson
Wilson
Wilson
s Party-State
D-MN
D-TN
D-LA
D-AK
D-TX
D-OH
D-MD
R-WS
D-NY
D-IL
D-GA
D-TX
D-MI
D-KY
D-MO
D-GA
D-SC
D-IL
D-NY
D-GA
D-MO
D-TN
D-IA
D-AL
D-LA
D-WV
D-MN
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FRINGE-BLOC 3 
Representatives
0 ’Neall D-IN
Penington D-DL
Perry D-SC
Phalan D-TN
Pidcock D-N J
Rowland D-NC
Rusk D-MD
Scott D-PA
Simmons D-NC
Wise D-VA
Party-State
APPENDIX 4
HOUSE MEMBERS EXCLUDED FROM ANALYSIS
The following members of the house of Repre
have not been included in the 
insufficient voting record.
analysis beca
Allen, John Mills MI(D)
Belmont, Perry NY (D )
Bowen, Henry VA (R )
Breckinridge, Clifton AR (D)
Browne, Thomas VA (R )
Brumm, Charles PA (R )
Bryce, Lloyd NY (D)
Bunnell, Frank PA (R )
Burnes, James MO (D)
Brunett, Edward MA (D)
Cockran, W. Bourke NY (D)
Collins, Patrick MA (D)
Davenport, Ira NY(R )
Felton, Charles CA (R )
Fitch, Ashbel NY(R )
Gay, Edward LA (D)
Glover, John MO (D)
Goff, Nathan WV (R )
Granger, Miles CT (D )
Greenman, Edward NY (D)
Hogg, Charles WV (D)
Houk, Leonidas TN (R )
Hovey, Alvin IN (R )
Laird, James NE (R )
Lee, William VA (D)
Lyman, Joseph IA (R )
Lynch, John PA (D)
Mattett, James PA (R )
Mahoney, Peter NY (D )
Mason, William IL (R )
McShane, John NE (D )
Morrow, William CA (R )
Neal, John TN (D )
Nutting, Newton NY(R )
Rayner, Isidor MD (D)
Snyder, Charles WV (D )
Stahlnecker, William NY (D )
West, George NY (R )
Whiting, Justin MI (D)
Witthorne, Washington TN (D)
Wilkins, Beriah OH (D )
Yost, Jacob VA (R )
sentatives 
use of an
Total of 42 Representatives
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